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Abstract 
 
Perceptions of Consistency in the Attitudes of Another  
 
Kevin R. Kennedy 
 
Committee Members: Dr. George R. Goethals, Dr. Donelson R. Forsyth, and Dr. Scott T. Allison 
 
The present study investigates how observers respond to two inconsistent inferences of an 
actor’s attitude. We designed a situation in which an observer forms an inference of an actor’s 
attitude, only to witness the actor engage in behavior that contradicts that inference one week 
later. Observers were then asked to rate what they believed the actor’s attitude was towards the 
issue and what they recalled their initial inference of the actor’s attitude to be. Observers were 
also asked to do the same for their own attitude towards the issue. Four main hypotheses were 
proposed that one, observers will attribute the counter-normative behavior to an attitude 
consistent with that behavior, and that, two, they would recall their prior inference of the actor’s 
attitude as consistent with their current perception of his attitude. Three, we expected that 
observers who viewed the actor as a valued, in-group member would subsequently change their 
own attitude in the direction of the actor’s behavior, and that, four, observers would recall their 
own initial attitude as consistent with their current attitude. Results demonstrate support, or 
partial support, for each of the four predictions in this study. Given the results, we proposed that 
the two inconsistent inferences can act as dissonant cognitions, causing the observers to alter 
their prior perception of the actor’s attitude to restore consistency. This effect was observed 
when the actor had both free choice and constrained choice, though to greater extent in the free 
choice condition. In-group members either changed their attitude in the direction of the actor’s 
behavior or ceased comparison, which occurred regardless of choice condition. Results indicate 
that inferences of another’s attitudes are not as stable as one might believe.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Consider the following scenario. You have supported a political candidate for years and 
have actively worked to campaign for them and convince your friends of this candidate’s merits.  
You believe that, based on your past observations of their behavior, the candidate supports one 
side of a divisive political issue. Given that you see yourself, and the candidate, as highly 
representative of the same political party, you too have formed a similar opinion on this issue. 
Suppose that you witness the candidate say or do something that seems inconsistent with what 
you believe they think, assume they have always thought, and what you think. This counter-
normative behavior calls into question not only what you believe about the issue, but what you 
infer that the actor believes about this issue. How might you respond? 
This study intends to investigate situations such as the one described above. We will 
make the novel prediction that observers, after witnessing a valued, in-group member (the actor) 
engage in counter-normative behavior, will not only attribute the actor’s behavior to an 
underlying attitude consistent with their observed behavior but will also believe that the actor has 
always held this position. The reasoning behind this novel proposition is based on prior research 
that demonstrates that individuals misperceive their own attitudes when asked to recall a prior 
attitude that has since changed. Individuals who had been induced to (Bem & McConnell, 1970), 
persuaded to (Goethals & Reckman, 1973), or experienced a natural shift in their attitudes over 
time (Goethals & Frost, 1978) misperceive their new attitude as being consistent with their initial 
attitude. Since it would be dissonant to acknowledge changing one’s attitude, individuals 
preemptively reduce the dissonance associated with attitude change by forgetting their 
perception of their original belief (Goethals & Reckman, 1973).  
 
 
8 
We propose that observers, after witnessing the counter-normative behavior, will be 
motivated to understand the actor’s behavior. If the observer has inferred that the actor has 
willingly changed their position towards the issue, the observer will be left with a discrepancy 
between the actor’s observed behavior and their original inference of the actor’s attitude. Such a 
discrepancy will arouse dissonance in the observer that they are motivated to reduce. Here, it 
would be easier for the observer to deny and distort their original perception of the actor’s 
attitude then to try and deny the actor’s behavior. We expect, then, that observers will 
subsequently not only misperceive consistency in the actor, but change their own attitude in the 
direction of the actor’s behavior, thus restoring consistency in how they perceive both the actor’s 
and their own attitude, provided that observers identity with the actor.  
 In this chapter, we will focus on the relevant literature that both informs our thinking and 
lends credence to the predictions presented above. We will begin with considering how 
individuals form impressions of others, with an emphasis on attributions of attitudes, and the 
similarities and differences between self-perception and social perception. Next, we will consider 
several reasons that observers may be motivated to conform to the actor’s perceived shift in 
attitude. These include social comparison theory, pressures towards uniformity, status and power 
of the actor within the group, and social identity theory. We will then review the literature on 
cognitive dissonance with consideration given to the impact of choice, presence of aversive 
consequences, and threat to self in dissonance arousal. Recent work on vicarious dissonance 
(Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003), through which much of the present study is based on, 
will be considered as well as the ways in which attribution theory could inform the reported 
results. Finally, we will conclude by examining the processes through which individuals forget 
dissonant cognitions and an explanation of the present study. 
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Attributions of Another’s Attitudes 
 In the process that we have proposed above, witnessing an individual engage in counter-
normative behavior requires the observer to first make an inference of the actor’s behavior. 
Fundamentally, people are motivated to understand the relationship between attributes of the 
individual and observed behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965). This motivation primarily stems from 
an individual’s need to both gain control of and improve the predictability of their surrounding 
environment (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). This process, however, is not without flaws, 
as a rather robust finding indicates that people tend to overestimate dispositional while 
underestimating situational explanations in attributions of behavior (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; 
Ross, 1977).   
 Although several attribution theories exist, they are all predicated on the notion that 
observers seek to understand the relationship of causal factors (dispositional and situational) on 
behavior. One such theory, correspondent inference theory, states that the correspondence 
between attitudes and behavior is strongest when such a correspondence separates the target 
individual from other individuals (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967). Theoretically, 
the less the behavior can be explained in terms of social desirability, and the more choice 
afforded the target in engaging in the behavior, the more information the observer is able to gain 
about the target’s attitude, thereby inferring a stronger correspondence between attitudes and 
behavior. Since the observer is unable to explain the observed behavior through other causal 
factors, they are left to infer that such behavior must reflect the actor’s underlying attitude (Jones 
& Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967). Note, that this concept is similar to the discounting 
principle, as observers will form an internal attribution of the actor’s behavior if they perceive 
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that the actor freely engaged in the behavior and if no other possible causes could explain the 
inferred causality between disposition and behavior (Kelley, 1972; 1973).  
 Empirical tests of correspondent inference theory have examined the role that the actor’s 
degree of choice and the observer’s prior expectation of the actor’s behavior have on forming a 
correspondent inference. Using the attribution of attitudes paradigm, Jones and Harris (1967) had 
participants infer the attitude of an actor based on materials supposedly authored by the actor, 
varying both the amount of choice the actor had been given in writing the essay and whether the 
essay was in favor of or against Fidel Castro. At the time, Fidel Castro was a salient political 
figure and a college student taking a pro-Castro position would have been an unexpected position 
and thus a low prior probability of occurring. Choice was manipulated as the actor was either 
allowed to decide to write a pro-Castro or anti-Castro essay, or assigned a stance by 
experimenters Participants used the essays written to infer the actor’s attitude towards Castro 
(Jones & Harris, 1967).  
Contrary to predictions, participants still inferred that the actor’s behavior reflected his 
attitude, even when the actor had constrained choice, although to a lesser extent than in the free 
choice condition. This finding was interpreted as evidence of Heider’s (1958) proposition that 
“behavior engulfs the field”, thus indicative that an individual engaging in behavior is sufficient 
to assume an attitude consistent with that behavior (Jones & Harris, 1967). Numerous studies 
have replicated this effect, leading Gilbert and Jones (1986) to coin the phrase “correspondence 
bias”, as observers are prone to infer correspondence between attitudes and behavior even when 
situational constraints have been placed on the actor. Gilbert and Malone (1995) further clarified 
this process by proposing a model that explains this phenomenon. Individuals first recognize the 
situation and rely on their own expectations and biases when perceiving and categorizing 
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behavior. If the behavior appears to violate their expectation of what they expect to occur, then 
they are prone to assume a dispositional inference as the behavior is given more weight in their 
attribution than the weight given to the situation. As social perception is typically egocentric and 
it is often difficult to take other people’s perspective into account, observers lack insight into 
how situations impact others (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Furthermore, dispositional attributions 
can be relatively automatic and require increased cognitive resources for individuals to change 
their initial inference (Winter & Uleman, 1984; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Thus, observers 
are prone to assume correspondence between an actor’s attitudes and behavior, even after 
witnessing the actor engage in behavior that could be explained by other causal factors.  
Similarities and Differences Between Social and Self Perception   
 As might be expected, the biased nature of attributing the attitudes of others often leads to 
differences between how people perceive their own attitudes and how they perceive the attitudes 
of other individuals. Jones and Nisbett (1972) argued that since individuals have more insight 
into their own mental states, relative to the mental states of others, they are more attuned to 
understanding how situational factors influence their own behavior. However, as they lack this 
insight into other individuals, they are more likely to rely on dispositions as an adequate 
explanation of that person’s behavior (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Such processes have been found 
at the root of many psychological phenomena, including self-serving attributions of current and 
future events, and the tendency to perceive the self as rational and others as bias (Pronin, 2008).  
While differences occur between how individuals perceive their actions and perceive 
those of others, other theories derive support by focusing on the similarities between social and 
self-perception. Self-perception theory holds that the process that underlies how an individual 
perceives their own actions is similar to how they perceive the actions of other. For example, 
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consider an example from Daryl Bem’s earliest work on self-perception theory. Bem 
hypothesized that a man who always eats brown bread would thus infer that he liked brown 
bread, just as his wife would arrive at the same inference based on her own observations of his 
behavior (Bem, 1965). Thus, Bem contends that individuals come to know their attitudes from 
inferences of their own behavior in a similar manner as they come to know other individual’s 
attitudes (Bem 1965; 1967; 1972). As in attribution theory, self-perception theory relies on the 
idea that individuals analyze both internal and external causes of behavior and that if no 
reasonable external reward (situational explanation) is present, they will assume that an internal 
cause, or disposition, is sufficient to explain the actor’s behavior, in the same manner as they 
explain their own (Bem, 1972).  
 In testing this proposition, Bem adapted a forced (induced) compliance paradigm initially 
developed by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Discussed in greater detail below, Festinger and 
Carlsmith (1959) found that people who were paid $1 to do a boring task and then tell someone it 
was interesting later reported enjoying the task more than individuals who had been paid $20 to 
do the same task. Bem had participants listen to a taped interaction in which an individual agreed 
to do a boring task and then tell someone in the other room that the task was fun. As in Festinger 
and Carlsmith (1959), the external reward was compensation of either $1 or $20 (Bem, 1967). 
The dependent variable was the observer’s perception of the actor’s attitude towards the task. 
Results indicated that observers rated the actor’s attitude towards the task higher when the actor 
was paid $1 than when he was paid $20, which was interpreted to mean that observers assumed 
that the actor must have found the task interesting if he did it for $1, since $1 is not a large 
enough incentive for lying (Bem, 1967). 
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The results reported from self-perception theory can be interpreted as individuals 
performing a similar cognitive analysis in understanding their own behavior as they do when 
trying to understand the behavior of others. Thus, when the external reward is low, individuals 
discount the situational explanation (payment) and conclude that their own behavior reflects their 
attitude. Research has recently drawn on Bem’s self-perception theory to understand how 
observers adopt the behavior of an actor with whom they share a merged identity. Termed 
vicarious self-perception, this process differs from traditional social influence processes as the 
influencer is unaware of their own influence towards the target (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). The 
model behind this theory (see figure one) is that if individuals form an internal attribution of the 
actor’s behavior, and share a merged identity with the actor, then the observer will change their 
self-perception and own behavior in accordance with the actor. However, if the actor’s behavior 
is attributed to an external factor, then there should be no subsequent effect on the observer’s 
attitude or behavior (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007).  
Empirical tests of the merged-identity model were conducted by manipulating a shared 
identity between the actor and observer through simulated brainwaves by using an EEG machine. 
Two conditions were used where half the participants were told that they had similar brain waves 
to the actor, while the other half were not provided information on shared brain waves. As 
predicted, those in the merged-identity (similar brain waves) condition changed their attitude in 
the direction of the actor’s behavior and later acted in a manner that was consistent with this 
change in attitude (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Of importance is that behavior change in the 
observer occurred only if the actor was perceived as having willingly engaged in the behavior. 
Thus, an internal attribution was a necessary precursor for behavior change among observers 
who felt a merged identity with the actor.  
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Motivations to Conform to the Actor’s Shift in Attitude  
 Given that observers are bias to infer correspondence between an actor’s attitude and 
behavior, as well as prefer to compare themselves to similar others, it is pertinent to consider 
how observers will react if an actor is perceived as deviant. Reasonably, the actor risks being 
rejected from the group. Individuals may cease communication with the deviant (Schachter, 
1951), tend to judge tend the deviant more harshly than out-group members (Maqrues, Yzerbyt, 
& Leyens, 1988), and experience more dissonance when in a group with members that they 
know disagree with them (Matz & Wood, 2005). Yet, as discussed below, certain circumstance 
may result in it being more advantageous to not reject the group member or, more difficult to do 
so based on the individual’s status or social identity.  
Comparing the Self to Similar Others 
 A merged identity between the actor and observer is synonymous to the observer viewing 
the actor as similar to themselves. Although manipulating similarity by using shared brain waves 
on an EEG seems sufficient to create perception of similarity, more general findings suggest that 
individuals prefer to compare themselves to similar others to satisfy their psychological need to 
know their own opinions and abilities. Given that one’s opinions are unstable and subject to 
change, individuals gain confidence and come to form their opinions through social comparison 
(Festinger, 1954). Note that while Festinger’s (1954) original work on social comparison theory 
considered peoples’ need to compare their opinions and abilities with those of others, we will 
focus only on opinions for the purposes of this study. Individuals compare themselves to those 
whom they believe should be similar, based on observable attributes. This is particularly 
important if the attribute is one that is indicative of the individual’s opinion (Goethals & Darley, 
1977). However, since individuals can never know another person’s true opinion, they must infer 
 
 
15 
other’s opinions from their behavior (Goethals & Darley, 1977). By comparing their opinions to 
similar others, individuals can validate their opinions, especially as they concern their beliefs. 
However, by doing so, individuals risk learning that their belief is incorrect and thus cannot be 
validated. Since individuals would expect to have similar beliefs with those that have similar 
attributes to themselves, receiving information that their beliefs are different from similar others 
can indicate that their own beliefs are wrong (Goethals & Darley, 1977). 
If one is presented with information that their belief is incorrect, this does not necessarily 
mean that they will cease comparison to the similar other. For example, in one experiment 
participants were asked to read about union workers and make inferences of the worker’s 
behavior. Participants were then given information that implied that their opinion was either 
consistent or inconsistent from that of the other group members. Results indicated that the group 
members who were most deviant were more likely to both change their attitude and subsequently 
reject group members who did not change as well. These effects were stronger in cohesive, 
compared to non-cohesive, groups (Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, & Raven, 1952). 
Therefore, in highly cohesive groups, one way individuals may attempt to increase their 
confidence in their opinion and lower the perception that they possess the wrong belief is to 
change their own opinion in the direction of the group’s opinion, thus restoring consistency in 
attitudes with fellow group members. 
Pressures Towards Uniformity and Conformity in Groups 
 Changing one’s opinion in the direction of the group is more likely to occur in groups 
that experience pressure towards uniformity. Individuals within groups are pressured towards 
uniform opinions for two reasons. First, there is a need to validate social reality and opinions, 
which can often be achieved through consensus. Second, the group needs to accomplish goals 
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and uniformity of opinion facilitates this objective (Festinger, 1950). Several factors, though, 
moderate group pressures towards uniformity. On a group level, the more cohesive the group is, 
the more discrepancy that exists within the group, and the more important the issue is, the more 
individuals will be willing to stay in the group. On the individual level, the individuals’ 
motivation to remain in the group will increase their own pressure towards uniformity (Festinger, 
1950). Important factors to consider are both the individuals’ willingness to remain in the group 
and whether leaving the group is a viable option. In some instances, an individual can freely 
leave a group and find another group that aligns more with their opinions. Certain groups 
domains though, particularly domains with a limited number of opposing groups, make it much 
more difficult to leave the group (Festinger, 1950). Individuals might also choose to stay in the 
group to increase their own status within the group’s hierarchy.  
 People are also likely to conform to the standards of the group, even if the standard 
appears to be incorrect. Asch’s (1951) widely known conformity study demonstrated that people 
are willing to give an incorrect answer on a simple judgement task if other members of the group 
had given the same incorrect answer. In the study, participants were brought into a room in small 
groups and were asked to judge lengths of lines, verbally giving their answers to the 
experimenter and the rest of the group. Unaware to the participant was that the other group 
members were confederates and were instructed by the experimenter to clearly give the wrong 
answer. However, even though the answer was clearly wrong, the participant still gave it as the 
correct answer to conform to other group members (Asch, 1951). Conformity, then, is a powerful 
mechanism within groups that helps to maintain consistent opinions among group members. 
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Power and Status of Group Members 
 Which group members engage in counter-normative behavior is an important determinant 
of whether that individual is rejected for their deviance or if group members will conform to the 
individual’s attitude. Higher status individuals are typically afforded greater latitude in deviating 
from the group, as perceptions of legitimacy are closely related to an individual’s status within 
the group. Individuals of high status who both conform to the group’s norms and demonstrate 
competence are more likely to be given idiosyncrasy credit, thus receive greater leeway in 
accomplishing the group’s goals (Hollander, 1993). This concept is based on the idea that people 
first make attributions of behavior prior to being influenced by the deviant group member and 
whether the behavior is perceived as normative or counter-normative varies as a function of the 
individual’s status within the group. In other words, individuals with high status within the group 
will be provided greater leeway in behaving counter-normatively than lower status group 
members.  
 Certain group members also derive their power over individuals from being a member of 
a reference group. Raven (1965) differentiated between private and public dependent sources of 
power, with the difference being whether the influencer’s presence was necessary (public) or not 
(private) to monitor the target’s behavior. Referent power is one form of a private dependent 
power, as individuals use the reference group to compare their own attitudes. According to 
Raven (1965), much of balance theory, similarity attraction, and dissonance theory can be 
understood in terms of conforming to the standards of the reference group. In other words, 
individuals may conform to the attitudes of another group member who has high referent power 
to reduce their own uncertainty. Thus, increased referent power, competence, and prior 
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conformity may cause high status group member to be perceived differently, and more favorably, 
after engaging in counter-normative behavior.  
Social Identity Theory 
 As noted above, certain situations can make it more difficult for an individual to reject, or 
leave, a group if they realize that their attitude is now discrepant with their fellow group 
members. In a situation where there are two dichotomous groups with opposing opinions, it is 
often difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to leave the group, thus making it easier to 
alter their perception of the group. This partly occurs because individual derive a sense of their 
own identity from their group membership and are driven to perceive their group as distinct 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Furthermore, within each group is a prototype which serves as a 
cognitive manifestation of the group that become salient when individuals think of the group. 
Prototypes, like other memories, are subject to recall biases that can be affected by the context in 
which they are formed and retrieved. In other words, different situations may alter the way an 
individual recalls a group’s prototype based on the situational demands. Typically, prototypes 
help maintain a distinction between groups by exaggerating between group-differences and 
minimizing within-group differences (Hogg, 2001).  
 Individuals in the group usually conform to the prototype, especially in groups that are 
highly cognitively salient. This conformity effect is more powerful for lower, compared to 
higher, identified group members. Thus, those who are not highly identified are more likely to 
change their attitudes and behaviors to better match the prototype to gain acceptance by the 
group. Perhaps most important for our purposes, individuals who most embody the prototype, 
referred to as prototypical group members, are perceived as having greater influence over group 
members (Hogg, 2001). One explanation, then, for why individuals might conform to the deviant 
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group member can be explained by the perception of the group member’s high prototypicality. 
Furthermore, groups help to decrease one’s uncertainty about their environment, which increases 
individuals’ predictability of their own outcomes and interactions. Therefore, the more 
uncertainty people experience the more they will be driven to strongly identify with the group, as 
by increasing their identification with the group, individuals can lower the amount of uncertainty 
they experience (Hogg, 2007). As a result, lower status group members are less likely to reject a 
group member who embodies the group’s prototypes, as doing so could be perceived a rejecting 
the group and the attributes that define it. Higher identified group members, on the other hand, 
are likely to perceive high levels of similarity between themselves and the deviant member. 
Forming an internal attribution of the deviant’s behavior that suggests that the group member no 
longer shares the same attitude as the observer could be perceived as a threat to both the group 
and their relationship with that individual. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
 The uncertainty that an individual experiences by realizing that a group member’s 
attitude is discrepant with their own attitude is a threat to consistency of attitudes within a group. 
Individuals have a psychological drive towards consistency that motivates to maintain a 
consistent relationship between two, or more, cognitions. Cognitive dissonance occurs when 
inconsistency between two cognitions invokes psychological discomfort in an individual, which 
the individual is motivated to reduce to restore consistency in their attitudes. Typically, the 
cognition that is least resistant to change will be alerted through either addition or subtraction of 
cognitive elements, thus restoring consonance (Festinger, 1957). Despite the predominant focus 
of dissonance research on dissonance aroused by individuals engaging in attitude-discrepant 
behavior, the original formulation of the theory arose from observations of group processes in a 
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doomsday cult. When Prophecy Fails chronicles the cult’s followers, who, inspired by their 
leader, Marion Keech, dealt with and rationalized their realization that their end of the world 
prophecy failed to occur. Prior to the event, the cult members had invested considerable time and 
energy into the group and preparing for the end of the world. When they realized that their 
prediction, and by extension their belief system, was wrong, the cult members were motivated to 
reduce the dissonance associated with their erroneous prediction (Festinger, Riecken, & 
Schachter, 1956). 
Festinger hypothesized that cult members could try to deny the belief or rationalize their 
actions, yet he believed that the role of social support was critical for reducing dissonance 
(Festinger et al. , 1956). According to Festinger, group members can both arouse and reduce 
cognitive dissonance depending on whether the group members are perceived as agreeing or 
disagreeing with the individual (Festinger, 1957). As other group members would presumably 
have “the same dissonance and the same pressures to reduce it” turning to other group members 
as a means of support serves as a mechanism to reduce the dissonance brought on by the false 
prediction (Festinger et al., 1956, p. 159). Here, it is important to acknowledge the similarities 
between Festinger’s proposition on the role of social support in dissonance reduction and his 
prior research on pressures towards uniformity in groups (see Festinger, 1950). Festinger 
proposed that “if more and more people can be persuaded that the system of belief is correct, 
then clearly it must after all, be correct” (Festinger et al., 1956, p, 159).  
Members of the Keech’s doomsday cult exhibited signs of using social support to reduce 
the dissonance brought on by the realization of the false prophecy, turning to their leader as a 
source of guidance and support. After appearing upset herself by her failed prediction, Keech 
then seemed to change her mind. She had received “messages” that the prophecy had not failed 
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after all, but instead the devoted support of the cult members had saved the world from ending, a 
message that in the days to come was eagerly adopted and spread by cult members in their 
attempts to convert more followers to their cause (Festinger et al., 1956). Details revealed from 
this original case study of cognitive dissonance are relevant for the purposes of this study in the 
ways that individuals can react to a perceived shift in attitude by a fellow, high status, group 
member. When the group members perceived Keech to have changed her attitude after realizing 
that her prediction was wrong, they accepted her rationalization, thus using her perceived attitude 
change as a motivator to change their own attitudes and reduce their own dissonance.  
Although dissonance was first studied as a group process, subsequent literature has 
primarily focused on an individual changing his own attitude in the direction of his counter-
attitudinal behavior. The main, relevant, aspects of dissonance theory for the purposes of this 
study are summarized as follows. First, dissonance can be aroused from several sources, such as 
a logical inconsistency, violation of cultural norms, or inconsistencies in attitudes over time 
(Festinger, 1957). When individuals make a decision, or forms an impression, how important the 
issue is to the individual directly affects the amount of dissonance they will experience. The 
more important the issue is, the more dissonance experienced, and thus greater attitude change. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of dissonance is directly related to the pressure to reduce 
dissonance, in that the more dissonance experienced, the more individuals will be driven to 
reduce it (Festinger et al., 1956). Therefore, although somewhat paradoxical, the more important 
an opinion is to an individual, the greater the potential that contradicting that opinion can lead to 
attitude change against the initial opinion. 
Dissonance can be reduced in several ways, including either changing one’s behavior or 
changing one’s knowledge. By knowledge, Festinger (1957) considered that individuals may 
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obtain new information about their attitude, through which the social group serves a vital 
function, or they may forget their original attitude. If, however, they are unable to forget their 
initial attitude, they may try and deny the consequences of their behavior or trivialize the 
behavior by altering the emphasis placed on the dissonant cognitions (Ratner, 1992; Simon, 
Greenberg & Brehm, 1995). Denying responsibility of the attitude-discrepant behavior has also 
been shown to be a route of dissonance reduction (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). Most 
important, at least for the purposes of this study, is that modes of dissonance reduction can work 
in tandem, as individuals can employ a combination of strategies to reduce dissonance, a point 
originally made by Festinger et al. (1956) in the earliest conception of the theory. Thus, while 
one of the most frequently tested modes of dissonance reduction appears to be attitude change in 
the direction of the discrepant behavior, it is important to consider that other modes are 
employed and that such modes are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Forced Compliance Paradigm 
 Despite the proposition that dissonance can be reduced through multiple modes, attitude 
change after engaging in attitude-discrepant behavior is, as implied earlier, one of the most 
prominent bodies of dissonance research. Much of this stems from Festinger and Carlsmith’s 
(1959) creation of the forced (induced) compliance paradigm, which manipulated the level of 
inconsistency produced between one’s private attitudes and outward behavior.  The main 
prediction of the study was that an inverse relationship would occur between the reward and 
amount of dissonance aroused, therefore prompting attitude change to reduce the dissonance. 
Thus, the less reward given for doing the attitude-discrepant behavior, the more dissonance that 
should be produced, prompting individuals to resolve dissonance by changing their private 
attitude to be in accordance with their behavior (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This hypothesis 
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was tested by manipulating the amount of reward given to participants. Participants were brought 
into the lab to do a boring task under the guise that the experimenters were interested in how well 
people performed on the task. The task involved repeatedly placing objects into trays for over an 
hour. Participants were then paid either $1, $20, or placed into a control condition. 
Experimenters then misled the participants by asking them to tell a fellow student (a confederate) 
in the next room that the task was interesting before completing a post-manipulation measure of 
their own attitude towards the task. Results indicated that participants who had been paid $1 
experienced more attitude change by now believing the task to be more favorable, relative to 
both the control and $20 condition. Theoretically, the idea was that individuals experienced a 
stronger magnitude of dissonance in the $1 condition given the small amount of the reward, 
which they reduced by showing greater attitude change than in the other conditions (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959). This paradigm later gave rise to other dissonance experiments that involved 
participants engaging in behavior that contradicted their attitudes.  
Conditions Necessary to Arouse Dissonance 
 Following the success of the forced compliance paradigm in producing attitude change, 
specific conditions under which the paradigm is most successful in changing one’s attitudes have 
been found since the original use of the paradigm. Many of these culminate in what is termed as 
the “new look” of dissonance theory (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). These necessary conditions (see 
Cooper & Fazio, 1984 for a thorough review) include that the individual must freely engage in 
the behavior (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967), feel personally responsible for the behavior 
(Cooper, 1971), and the behavior must arouse aversive consequences (Goethals, Cooper, & 
Naficy, 1979). For the purposes of this study, we will focus primarily on the role of free (high) 
choice and aversive consequences in arousing dissonance.  
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Individuals must willingly choose to engage in the behavior to arouse dissonance. 
Researchers have found that individuals who have been induced to make a speech or write an 
essay in favor of an issue that they are strongly opposed to will change their attitude in favor of 
the issue if they have willingly chosen to give the speech or write the essay. Theoretically, 
individuals must first consider the incentive offered to them and then decide whether they wish 
to engage in the behavior (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). When researchers varied the 
incentive ($0.50 or $2.50) as well as the level of choice participants were given, they found that 
greatest attitude changed occurred for participants who were in the low-incentive, high-choice 
condition. Of note, they also found that these participants also took longer to decide whether to 
write the counter-attitudinal essay. Results indicated that when participants were afforded a high 
degree of freedom in engaging in the behavior a low incentive (payment of $0.50) led to greater 
attitude change, but with less choice a high incentive (payment of $2.50) lead to greater attitude 
change (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). Thus, having high choice in engaging in the behavior is 
a necessary precursor for attitude change resulting from cognitive dissonance.  
 Besides choice, it is important that individuals know the consequences of their behavior. 
In other words, the aversive consequences of their behavior must be either known (foreseen) or 
could have been known (foreseeable) beforehand. Prior research varied both foreseeability 
(foreseen, foreseeable, versus unforeseeable) and the amount of information (non-informed 
versus informed) by having participants either write a counter-attitudinal essay or give a speech 
on increasing the number of students at the university, a counter-attitudinal position for many of 
the participants in the study. For the foreseeable and foreseen groups, researchers told 
participants that they would send their speeches/essays to certain groups on campus who were 
interested in gaining a student’s perspective. Only the foreseen group was told ahead of time that 
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university admissions might be one of the groups interested in their essays/speeches (Goethals, 
Cooper, & Naficy, 1979). 
 After giving the speech (or writing the essay), participants were either informed or not 
informed that their speeches/essays had been randomly assigned to be sent to university 
admissions. Results indicated that those in the foreseen or foreseeable-informed conditions 
experienced dissonance, as evidenced by attitude change, which was interpreted as individuals 
feeling personally responsible for the act (Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979). Understandably, 
those in the foreseeable conditions could have considered ahead of time whether one of the 
groups on campus that were interested in their perspective was university admissions, thus 
arousing dissonance that was resolved by changing their attitude towards the position.  
The Role of the Self in Dissonance Arousal     
While research has established that dissonance results from inconsistent cognitions, the 
precise causal factor that both arouses and motivates individuals to reduce dissonance was not 
clearly established in the original theory. While Festinger’s (1957) original theory stated that 
dissonance was aroused from two inconsistent cognitions, it did not account for the role of the 
self in dissonance processes (Aronson, 2019). One’s self-concept is important for both 
dissonance arousal and reduction as the attitude must be discrepant not only with one’s current 
attitude but with how one views themselves (Aronson, 1969). Understandably, people are driven 
to perceive themselves as competent, moral, and able to anticipate their own behaviors. Being 
unable to do so can serve as a threat to one’s own self-concept (Aronson, 2019). Thus, much of 
dissonance theory can be understood as an individual’s drive to maintain a positive self-concept, 
including the New Look version of dissonance (see Cooper & Fazio, 1984). Recall that at the 
center of the New Look formulation is that personal responsibility and aversive consequences are 
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critical determinants for dissonance arousal. Thibodeau and Aronson (1992), however, contend 
that both determinants implicitly involve the individual’s self-concept. Personal responsibility 
invokes the self-concept if the behavior is an accurate reflection of the self. By this logic, if the 
behavior is not reflective of the self, then the causal factor would not be self-attributed and 
individuals would not experience dissonance. Likewise, aversive consequences invoke the self-
concept, as what is defined as aversive depends on the individual own self-perception of 
competence and definition of morality (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). 
Furthermore, the self can also serve as a mechanism to protect oneself from experiencing 
dissonance. Self-affirmation theory posits that if individuals can affirm a value of themselves 
that is important to how they view themselves, doing so can prevent them from experiencing 
dissonance and thus eliminate the need to change their attitude (Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, 
1988). Therefore, not only must an action result in aversive consequences for the individual to 
arouse dissonance, but it must also threaten their sense of self, particularly their perception of 
competence or their own morality.  
Vicarious Dissonance  
 As alluded to above, although dissonance research has largely focused on dissonance as 
an individual experience, recent research has found that dissonance can occur in groups as well. 
Recall that the earliest case study of cognitive dissonance found that the social support of fellow 
group members could protect individuals from experiencing dissonance (Festinger et al., 1956). 
The dissonance individuals can feel in a group setting has been explored previously, finding that 
individuals who work harder to get into groups end up liking the groups more (Aronson & Mills, 
1959) and individuals who expect to be in a group with those that disagree with them can 
experience dissonance (Matz and Wood, 2005). Furthermore, individuals have been found to 
 
 
27 
experience dissonance and change their attitudes if the attitude expressed implied an associated 
attitude (not critical for group membership), relative to a definitional attitude (critical for group 
membership). For example, conservative participants who advocated for extending government 
health care (associated attitude) were more likely to change their attitude than those who 
advocated against voting for Ronald Reagan, a definitional attitude (Cooper & Mackie, 1983).  
The above findings, however, suggest a situation in which an individual experiences dissonance 
from their own behavior, whether it be justifying the effort expended to get into a group, or to 
explain how, despite the evidence, group members were not wrong about their prediction of the 
end of the world. It seems reasonable, though, that individuals could also experience dissonance 
from witnessing another group member contradict his or her own attitudes. In such a situation, 
individuals face a conflict between their own private attitude and the actor’s outward behavior. 
 Prior research has demonstrated that an individual will experience dissonance and 
subsequently change their own attitude towards the issue after witnessing a fellow group member 
engage in attitude-discrepant behavior. Known as vicarious cognitive dissonance, the theory 
posits that observers will change their own attitude if the actor engaging in the attitude-
discrepant behavior is of the same in-group as the observer (Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 
2003; Cooper & Hogg, 2007). To test this, experimenters pre-tested students at a university in 
the United States for their attitudes towards increasing tuition, a controversial campus issue. 
Information was also collected on the extent to which students identified with their residential 
college, to which all undergraduate students are randomly assigned upon matriculation at the 
university (Norton et al., 2003) 
 Only participants who were strongly against a tuition increase (defined as being in the 
lowest quartile on the pre-test) and highly identified with their residential college were recruited 
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to participate in the second party of the study. During the study, participants were under the 
impression that it was a study on linguistics (see Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979) and were 
asked to rate the speech of another individual sitting in the other room whom they could see 
through a two-way mirror. Observers, however, could not recognize the other individual (a 
confederate) as he or she was intended to be a typical, or average, group member and was always 
the same gender as the observer. The experimenter asked the actor their opinion on raising 
tuition, which they were against, and either told the actor it was their choice to give the speech 
(high choice) or that they should give the speech (low choice). Participants were under the 
impression that the speeches would be reviewed by university officials (aversive consequences, 
see Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979). After hearing the speech, participants completed several 
post-manipulation measures on their affect and attitude towards raising tuition (Norton et al., 
2003). 
 Results indicated that individuals changed their attitude in the direction of the actor’s 
behavior if the actor was an in-group member. Thus, a pre-manipulation assessment of 
identification with their residential colleges predicted attitude change in favor of increasing 
tuition. Results also indicated that individuals who heard an out-group member give the speech 
did slightly change their attitude in the opposite direction of the actor’s behavior, though this was 
not a statically significant effect (Norton et al., 2003). Subsequent research found that it was not 
necessary for the individuals to actually hear the speech to change their attitude, only know that 
although the actor stated that he or she was against the issue before giving the speech, they still 
agreed to give the speech (Norton et al., 2003). When the experimenter asked the actor their 
opinion on the issue before giving the speech, if the actor said they were in-favor of the issue and 
then gave the speech, no attitude change in the observers occurred. Only when the actor said they 
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were against the issue, yet still agreed to give the counter-attitudinal speech did in-group 
observers change their attitude. This was interpreted to mean that observers only change their 
attitude if they know the actor is against the issue (Norton et al., 2003). 
This finding, though, does not explain whether the observers believed that the actor 
changed their opinion. In anecdotes used to explain vicarious dissonance, it is implied that the 
actor giving the attitude-discrepant speech would likely experience dissonance and then change 
their own attitude towards the issues, just as those identified with the actor and witnessed the 
speech would as well (Norton et al., 2003; Cooper & Hogg, 2007). However, findings of 
vicarious dissonance imply that observers do not infer a change in the actor’s attitudes in a 
vicarious dissonance paradigm. To rule out the possibility that observers conform to a perceived 
shift in the actor’s attitude, Monin et al. (2004) manipulated whether the actor was known to 
agree or disagree with the position expressed in the speech. The actor (a confederate) explicitly 
expressed whether they agreed or disagreed with the position being advocated (giving parents 
access to student health records) before agreeing to give a speech in favor of giving parents 
access (the attitude-discrepant behavior). As with prior research, observers only changed their 
attitude in favor of giving parents access when the actor was known to disagree with the issue. 
Participants then rated their perception of the actor’s attitude in a post-manipulation 
questionnaire. Results indicates that the observers inferred the speaker’s attitude as consistent 
with their expressed statement before engaging in the behavior, rather than their agreement to 
engage in counter-attitudinal behavior (Monin et al., 2004). To clarify, an actor who stated that 
they were against giving parents’ access to student health records and then gave a speech 
advocating for this stance was perceived by participants as being against providing access. 
Cooper and Hogg (2007) later assert that the results in Monin et al. (2004) are indicative that the 
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“participants remembered correctly that the speaker was against the position” and that 
participants did not infer attitude change in the actor when explicitly asked (p. 383). We, 
however, interpret these results differently than Cooper and Hogg (2007), as discussed below. 
Conditions Necessary to Arouse Vicarious Dissonance 
Despite the perplexing finding that observers change their own attitude while 
acknowledging that the actor has not changed his own attitude, vicarious dissonance paradigms 
have been found to create attitude change in an observer in conditions similar to cognitive 
dissonance studies. Aversive consequences (Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979) and the actor 
willingly engaging in the behavior (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) are the main determinants 
necessary for attitude change after witnessing an actor’s attitude-discrepant behavior (Norton et 
al., 2003; Monin et al., 2004; Blackman, Keller, & Cooper, 2016; Cooper, Feldman, & 
Blackman, 2019). Lastly, and relevant for the purposes of this study, vicarious dissonance can 
occur by imagining the speaker engage in attitude-discrepant behavior. For example, participants 
who imagined a friend in their same political party (Democrat or Republican) give a speech that 
was against the party’s typical position on the Affordable Care Act changed their attitude in the 
direction of the imagined actor’s behavior when the actor was perceived to have high choice in 
giving the imagined speech, compared to those in the low choice conditions (Cooper, Feldman, 
& Blackman, 2019).  
Memory, Misperception, and Forgetting Inconsistent Cognitions 
 Experiencing dissonance can not only cause individuals to change their attitudes, but to 
forget prior attitudes that have since changed. Not surprisingly, research on the human memory 
has been shown to be both malleable and prone to bias and reinterpretation. For example, how a 
question is asked can change how respondents answer it (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Memories 
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about the self are prone to distortion and misperception as well. Greenwald (1980) likens the 
individual’s memory about their past as akin to a totalitarian regime as both are self-serving 
given that how individuals perceive and remember information is subject to error. Such errors 
have previously been reported in relation to remembering prior attitudes that have since changed. 
After changing their attitude on an issue, people are likely to perceive their stance on the issue as 
being consistent over time (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973). In other 
words, they will fail to recognize that they have changed by believing that their current attitude is 
the one that they have always held. 
Inducing Individuals to Change Attitudes  
 This effect was originally found by researchers testing the efficacy of the interpersonal 
simulation paradigm employed by Bem (1965; 1967) in testing self-perception theory. As 
described above these studies adapted the forced (included) compliance paradigm by having 
participants observe an actor complete a boring task for $1 or $20 and then give their assessment 
of the actor’s attitude. In line with results from dissonance experiments, results indicated that 
people assumed the actor liked the task more in the $1 condition than in the $20 since there was 
less external incentive, which was interpreted to mean that individuals infer their attitudes from 
their behavior (Bem, 1965; 1967; 1972). In an experiment testing the salience of pre-
manipulation attitudes, experimenters had college student give their opinion on several issues, 
including how much control over courses they thought students should have on a college 
campus. As might be expected, the majority of students were in favor of increasing the amount 
of control students should have over course offerings. One week later, participants were brought 
back in and either asked (high choice) or told (low choice) to write an essay against giving 
students more control over course offerings. After, participants gave their post-manipulation 
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attitude, were asked to recall their prior attitude, and were asked whether they believed that they 
had changed their attitude. Results indicated that participants perceived consistency between 
their attitudes between the two sessions and the majority who had changed did not believe that 
they had changed their attitude when asked (Bem & McConnell, 1970). 
Persuading Individuals to Change Attitudes  
It should be noted that above findings were originally used in support for Bem’s self-
perception theory. Goethals and Reckman (1973) later expanded upon this by reframing the 
results in terms of dissonance theory, proposing that individuals reduce the dissonance associated 
with changing their attitude by forgetting their original attitude. In doing so, a pre-test was 
administered to high school juniors and seniors on several controversial political issues, 
including the use of bussing in public schools. Participants discussed the issue in small groups 
led by a fellow student (a confederate), selected for his high status and credibility among the 
students. Experimenters constructed groups composed of participants with homogenous 
attitudes, divided by those who were in support of the issues versus those opposed to the issue. 
The discussion was led by the confederate, who was instructed to take the counter-attitudinal 
stance to the other students in the group with the intent of persuading them to change their minds 
(Goethals & Reckman, 1973). Note that this study differs from Bem and McConnell (1970) as 
participants were persuaded to change their attitude, as opposed to induced to change.  
As in Bem and McConnell (1970), participants gave their post-manipulation attitude and 
were then asked to try and recall their initial rating of their attitude towards bussing under the 
assumption that experimenters would check their response to ensure correctness. Results 
indicated that those in favor of bussing experienced more attitude change than those against and 
were more likely to misperceive their new attitude as being consistent with their prior attitude. 
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Those who were against bussing did show attitude change and similar recall errors as well 
(Goethals & Reckman, 1973). Other studies have found similar results, including a study 
conducted at Cornell University (see Neisser, 1981, p. 178) and at Williams College (Ratner, 
1992), providing evidence of the effect’s robustness. 
Recalling Attitudes that Change Naturally Over Time  
The research conducted on attitude recall after being induced to or persuaded to change 
has typically been conducted with either one week (Bem & McConnell, 1970) or 10 to 14 days 
(Goethals and Reckman, 1973). Here, participants were asked to recall prior attitudes that had 
recently changed. Later research found, though, that such recall errors that perceive the prior 
attitude as consistent to their current attitude can occur over larger periods of time. In one study, 
incoming college freshman were asked to rate their values on a questionnaire and then asked to 
rate them again seven months later. Researchers varied whether participants were asked to recall 
their prior value or give their current (final) value first, thus creating two-conditions based on 
recall order: recall-final and final-recall. Results were then assessed by computing correlations to 
measure whether the participant’s recall attitude was better correlated with the initial or final 
attitude. Across both conditions, the recall attitude had a stronger relationship with the final 
attitude than with the recall attitude (Goethals & Frost, 1978). This is indicative that individuals 
tend to perceive consistency regardless of whether they can use their post-manipulation attitude 
when rating their recall attitude or not. 
The Present Study 
 The present study is designed to address two goals. First, this study aims to examine 
whether two inconsistent inferences of another person’s behavior are a source of cognitive 
dissonance for the observer. If so, we make the novel prediction that observers will reduce 
 
 
34 
dissonance by altering their prior inference of the actor’s behavior to be consistent with the 
current correspondent inference of the actor’s behavior. Thus, they will misperceive consistency 
in the actor’s attitudes over time. Second, and related to the first goal, this study aims to examine 
Monin et al.’s (2004) findings that observers change their own attitude while believing that the 
actor’s attitude does not change. As described above, observers in a vicarious dissonance 
paradigm do not believe that the actor has changed his attitude, either on the post-manipulation 
measure or when directly asked (Cooper & Hogg, 2007). However, if the data supports the first 
goal of this study, then we propose that this finding could explain why observers do not infer 
attitude change in the actor. We expect, then, that observers will not recognize that the actor has 
changed his attitude, as doing so would be dissonant. As such, we have employed a modified 
imagined vicarious dissonance paradigm (see Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman, 2019) by 
providing observers enough information to infer the actor’s attitude in session one, only to 
realize this inference is incorrect in session two. This more closely resembles an interaction in 
which an individual forms an impression of another’s attitude at one time, only to have it be 
violated at another time.   
 For this study, we have chosen to have observers imagine a Democratic candidate for an 
upcoming election give a speech against the Affordable Care Act. Given that the candidate is a 
Democrat, this is likely an unexpected behavior for the actor with a low prior probability of 
occurring (Jones & Harris, 1967). Since the candidate would not gain any social benefits from 
engaging in the behavior, we expect that the behavior should provide substantive information to 
the observer about the actor’s underlying attitude (Jones & Davis, 1965). Thus, given that people 
are bias to assume correspondence between attitudes and behavior, we propose that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Observers will attribute the actor’s counter-normative behavior  
to an attitude that is consistent with that behavior. 
 
In other words, we expect that they will make a correspondent inference between the actor’s 
behavior and underlying attitude. 
 If observers do form this correspondent inference, then such an inference will be 
inconsistent with their prior inference of the actor’s attitude. Based on this reasoning, we propose 
the novel hypothesis of this study: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Observers will falsely perceive consistency in the actor’s attitude  
just as they misperceive their own. 
 
Given that it is dissonant for individuals to recognize their own attitude change (Goethals & 
Reckman, 1973) we expect that recognizing that another person has changed their attitude is also 
an instance of two dissonant cognitions. Theoretically, this would also violate individual’s need 
to accurately predict their own environment and the actions of others (Heider, 1958). Two 
inconsistent inferences of another’s behavior also imply a threat to one’s own competence as it 
pertains to social perception and judgement, which is believed to be necessary for dissonance 
arousal (Aronson, 1969). Furthermore, we expect that the effect will be stronger for in-group 
members and if asked directly as to whether the actor has changed their attitude, observers will 
believe that he has not changed his position on the issue. 
 If the observer has inferred that the actor’s attitude is now discrepant with their own 
attitude, then we expect to replicate vicarious dissonance findings: 
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 Hypothesis 3: If the observer views the actor as a valued, in-group member,  
they will change their own attitude in the direction of the actor’s behavior. 
 
Given that this is intended to replicate vicarious dissonance research, we expect identification 
should moderate the effect on attitude change in those observing the behavior, such that the more 
identified individuals are with the group, the more attitude change should occur (Norton et al., 
2003; Monin et al., 2003). Although not previously tested in the vicarious dissonance literature, 
we also propose that how important the issue is to the observer will impact the magnitude of 
dissonance, as evidenced through attitude change, such that the more important the issue is, the 
more the observer will change their own attitude in the direction of the actor’s behavior 
(Festinger, 1957).  
 Lastly, we expect to replicate prior findings on how individuals perceive consistency in 
their own attitudes: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Observers who have changed their attitude will misperceive their new 
attitude as being consistent with their prior attitude (i.e. will not infer attitude change) 
 
This is intended to replicate previous research that has demonstrated that individuals who have 
changed their attitude believe that they have not changed, and that their prior attitude is 
consistent with their current attitude (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973; 
Goethals & Frost, 1978).  
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 Note that three of the four hypotheses have already been supported in the literature. We 
propose that replicating these three hypotheses, with the addition of the novel hypothesis, will 
provide a better understanding of how individuals respond to forming to two inconsistent 
inferences of another’s attitude.  
 To test these four predictions, we will employ a 2 (political party: Democrat/Republican) 
x 2 (choice: high/low) between subject’s factorial design. This design is consistent with prior 
research on vicarious dissonance (Norton et al., 2003; Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman, 2019) and 
will adopt a similar paradigm, albeit with some modifications based on Bem & McConnell 
(1970) and Goethals and Reckman (1973). As the actor will be a Democratic candidate for 
election, Democrats are the in-group members, while Republicans are the out-group members. 
The following study is an empirical test of these hypotheses.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
Participants 
 To test our predictions, 300 participants were recruited through Cloud Research (mTurk 
prime) to participate in a study on political campaigns. All recruited workers had completed a 
minimum of 100 studies through mTurk and had a 95%+ completion rate. Hits were 
microbatched to recruit participants over a twenty-four-hour period (see Burhmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Buhrmester, Talaifar, & Gosling, 2018). 300 participants were initially recruited 
with the goal that 80% would complete the second half of the study, bringing the total participant 
number to 240. Given that the main prediction reported here is novel (that observers will 
misperceive consistency in an actor who has engaged in counter-normative behavior), we 
expected 240 to leave us with 60 participants per group. Of the 300 originally recruited, 199 
participants took part in the second part of the study. 26 were excluded for either failing to 
follow directions or for failing more than one attention check, bringing the final number of 
participants in the study to 173.  
 The study employed a 2 (political party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (choice: high/low) 
between subject’s factorial design. Of the 173, 113 self-identified as Democrats (Mage = 36.3, 
SDage = 12.290) and 60 self-identified as Republicans (Mage = 42.42, SDage = 36.261). Political 
orientation was assessed on a scale of one (very liberal) to seven (very conservative), indicating 
expected differences between Democrats (Morientation = 2.93, SDorientation = 1.741) and Republicans 
(Morientation = 5.07, SDorientation = 1.191). Identification with political party was assessed on a one 
(not very identified) to seven (very identified) scale, indicating little difference in identification 
with their respective political party between Democrats (Midentification = 4.46, SDidentification = 1.963) 
and Republicans (Midentification = 4.49, SDidentification = 1.785. 106 participants identified as male 
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and 67 identified as female, roughly equally dispersed between both political parties. 21% of the 
participants identified as non-white. Participants were compensated $0.50 for completing the 
pre-test and $1.00 for completing the second part of the study. 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via CloudResearch to participate in the study under the guise 
that they are being asked to complete a study to better understand how voters’ attitudes towards 
political campaigns evolve over time. The election used for this study was a hypothetical 
upcoming election in Central Florida for a seat in the House of Representatives in a suburban 
swing district. Two separate sessions were used with the same participant pool and mTurk 
worker identifications numbers were collected and anonymized to match data from the two 
sessions. The timing feature on Qualtrics was used to ensure participants spent a minimum of 
one second per question, to minimize participants randomly filling in questions. 
Session One 
 Participants were informed that the study would be conducted in two sessions and that 
they would be incentivized to complete the second part with additional compensation ($1.00).  
Participants completed the pre-test questionnaire that was based on pre-tests administered in 
Goethals and Reckman (1973) and Bem and McConnell (1970) (see Appendix B for session one 
materials). As such, participants were asked to rate their own attitudes towards three current 
political issues, which have been selected for being relevant to both Democrats and Republicans, 
as done in Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman (2019). Data from the 2018 midterm elections were 
used to select issues that are currently pertinent to voters (see “2018 Midterm Voters: Issues and 
Political Values”, 2018). The three issues chosen were the Affordable Care Act, Abortion, and 
Environmental Protection.  
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 After, participants were introduced to two fictitious candidates, Michael (Republican) and 
David (Democrat) through short vignettes based on “a day in the life of a candidate”, allegedly 
drawn from each candidate’s website to provide background information on each candidate to 
participants (vignettes provided in Appendix B). In truth, the vignettes were designed to allow 
participants to infer the candidate’s attitudes without explicitly telling them each candidate’s 
attitude. By doing this, the demand was placed on the participants’ own judgement abilities as 
they pertain to social perception and accurately predicting the actions of others. Both vignettes 
were written to be prototypical of each political party. For example, the Democratic candidate 
was said to enjoy spending his afternoons organizing recycling drives in his neighborhood, thus 
implying his stance on protecting the environment. Directly after reading the vignettes, 
participants completed a questionnaire on their assessment of each candidate’s attitudes, using an 
identical scale as they one they used for their own attitudes.  
Second Session 
 One week after the last participant completed the pre-test, participants were contacted by 
email to complete the second party of the study. Participants completed the second part of the 
study seven to twelve days after they completed the pre-test. This timeline is consistent with 
prior research using one week (Bem & McConnell, 1970) and four to fourteen days (Goethals 
and Reckman, 1973) between the two sessions. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 
high choice or low choice condition and were informed that a debate recently occurred between 
the two candidates and that the experimenters are interested in gauging their reactions.  
 A short paragraph explained to the participants that during the debate, the debate 
moderator, in the spirit of political unity, had a special devil’s advocate round and has asked one 
of the candidates to take a position that is inconsistent with the typical belief of their party. 
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Participants were then given what they believed was a transcript of the debate, designed to make 
the scenario seem more real and involving (see Appendix C for the high choice condition and 
Appendix D for the low choice condition). In the high choice condition, the debate moderator 
asked one of the two candidates to volunteer to give the speech and to select the issue they would 
like to speak on. The speech was always given by the Democrat against the Affordable Care Act, 
who was informed that he would not be penalized for not giving the speech, to which he 
responded that he “was happy to give a speech against the Affordable Care Act”. The candidate 
was implied to deliberate (“let me think…I would be willing to speak against the Affordable 
Care Act”) to indicate he had put time and thought into selecting which issue he wanted to give a 
counter-attitudinal speech on. In the low choice condition, the moderator chose the Democrat to 
give the speech, assigned him to speak on the Affordable Care Act, and did not mention whether 
he would be permitted to not give the speech. In both conditions, the moderator stated that the 
candidate’s speech could be useful in upcoming marketing materials for the election, thus 
implying aversive consequences (see Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979). Participants were 
asked to pay close attention to the transcript as there would be several “reading comprehension” 
questions once they were done (see post-manipulation materials in Appendix E).  
 After reading the transcript, participants were asked to spend one to two minutes imaging 
the speech that speech the actor gave against the Affordable Care Act. Consistent with past 
research on vicarious dissonance, participants were not shown the actual speech, supposedly for 
confidentiality purposes (see Norton et al., 2003; Monin et al., 2004). This, however, helped to 
ensure that attitude change resulted from an dispositional inference of the actor’s behavior, not 
from being persuaded by the speech. The timing feature was used in Qualtrics to ensure 
participants spent a minimum of two minutes on the page, with a timer displayed to let them 
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know how long they had been on the page. Participants then completed the manipulation checks 
(“reading comprehension questions”) and the post-manipulation attitude questionnaire, asking 
them to state both their attitude towards the Affordable Care Act and their perception of the 
actor’s attitude towards the Affordable Care Act. These two measures were counterbalanced. 
Next, participants were told that prior research indicates that people often do not take online 
surveys very seriously, and thus “to see how seriously you have taken this survey, we would like 
you to try and fill out the following questions exactly as you did last week”. Participants were 
also told that the experimenters would be checking their recall attitudes to ensure that they had 
been accurate in recalling their attitude from the previous week, as done in Goethals and 
Reckman (1973). This placed the demand characteristics on “accuracy of recall rather than 
consistency of recall with current attitudes” as done in Goethals and Reckman (1973, p. 494) and 
Bem and McConnell (1970). Again, the order of recall (participant or actor) was 
counterbalanced. Page breaks were used in Qualtrics to ensure that participants could not simply 
use their attitude on the post-manipulation questionnaire as their recall attitude. Thus, they were 
forced to recall their attitudes from memory without relying on their answer to the post-
manipulation attitudes questionnaires.  
Materials 
Pre-Test Questionnaire 
 The pre-test questionnaire asked participants for demographic information (age, gender, 
location, and race/ethnicity), their political party, and the extent to which they identified with 
their political party on a one (1) not very identified to seven (7) very identified scale. They were 
also asked to state their political orientation using a one (1) very liberal to seven (7) very 
conservative scale, as well as their confidence in the orientation. Unless otherwise stated, all 
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confidence scales used a one (1) not very confident to seven (7) very confident scale. 
Participants’ own political attitudes towards the Affordable Care Act, Abortion, and 
Environmental Protection were measured on a one (1) strongly opposed to seven (7) strongly in 
favor scale. Each political issue was given a brief definition to ensure participants all had at least 
a base knowledge of the issue we were referring to. The Affordable Care Act was defined as 
“Obamacare, mandate that everyone has healthcare”, Abortion was defined as “a women’s right 
to choose”, and Environmental Protection was defined as “government regulations to protect the 
environment”. The final portion of the participants’ attitude measurement asked them to rate how 
important they found each issue on a one (1) not at all important to seven (7) very important 
scale.  
 Participants then completed similar questionnaires for both the Republican and 
Democratic candidates using the same scales as above on what they believed each candidate’s 
attitude to be, and their confidence in this assessment. All participants completed questionnaires 
on the Republican candidate before they did so for the Democratic candidate. The last measure 
participants completed had participants rate how similar they felt to each candidate on a one (1) 
not very similar to seven (7) very similar scale (see Appendix B for all pre-test materials).  
Post-manipulation Questionnaire  
 The reading comprehension questions on the post-manipulation measures served as 
manipulation checks and asked participants to identify the issue the actor gave the speech on, 
whether the speech was for or against the issue, and how much choice they believed the actor 
had in giving the speech on a one (1) very low choice to seven (7) very high choice scale. 
Participants then completed post-manipulation measures of their attitude, their perception of the 
candidate’s attitude, and how confident they were in their assessment of both their attitude and 
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the candidate’s attitude. Scales were identical to the ones used above, with attitude measured on 
a one (1) strongly opposed to seven (7) strongly in favor scale, and confidence measured on a 
one (1) not very confident to seven (7) very confident scale. Participants answered the post-
manipulation attitude questions (counter-balanced) before they answered the post-manipulation 
confidence in attitude questions (counter-balanced).  
 Participants recalled their prior attitudes towards the Affordable Care Act, Abortion, and 
Environmental protection on the same one (1) to seven (7) scale of strongly opposed to strongly 
in favor. Participants also recalled both the actor’s prior attitudes towards the same three issues, 
again on the same one (1) to seven (7) scale they had used during the pre-test and for their own 
post-manipulation attitude. Recall order (participant or actor) was counterbalanced as well. The 
final part of the post-manipulation questionnaire asked participants to identify the political party 
of both candidates (Democrat and Republican) as well as their own political party. For each 
candidate and for themselves, participants rated the extent to which they (and the actor) 
identified with their political party on a one (1) not very identified to seven (7) very identified 
scale, and the extent to which the individual (either candidate or participant) 
was representative of their political party, on a one (not at all representative) to seven (7) very 
representative scale. Note that these measures are based on ones given in Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & 
Holzworth (1993) and used in vicarious dissonance research (see Norton et al., 2003; Monin et 
al., 2004; Blackman, Keller, & Cooper, 2016; Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman, 2019).  
 Participants also completed questions on post-manipulation similarity to each candidate 
on a one (not very similar) to seven (7) very similar scale. For this questionnaire, all participants 
answered questions pertaining to the Democratic candidate first, then the Republican candidate, 
and then themselves. The last question asked participants to rate the extent to which they 
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believed they had changed their attitude and the extent to which the actor had changed their 
attitude towards the Affordable Care Act. Henceforth, we will refer to this measure as the 
subjective attitude change measure, which was measured on a one (1) not all to seven (7) 
completely changed scale (see Appendix E for all post-manipulation materials).  
Attention Checks 
 Several attention checks were used and measures were taken during both the pre-test and 
post-manipulation questionnaires to increase the reliability of the data. First, both surveys used 
Captcha verification feature on Qualtrics to prevent spam. Second, attention checks (e.g. “If you 
are paying attention then select 7”) were used on both surveys (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009). Lastly, open-ended responses were used at the end of both surveys asking 
participants to “in one or two sentences, please describe what you think is the purpose of this 
study”. This allowed the experimenters to check responses for cogent, non-spam or random, 
answers to increase confidence in the accuracy of the data.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
Pre-Test 
Participants’ Attitudes 
 Results from the pre-test were analyzed to ensure significant, pre-manipulation, 
differences between Democrats and Republicans. As expected, an independent groups t-test 
found that Democrats were more in favor of the Affordable Care Act than Republicans t(171) = 
8.462, p<0.001. Democrats also believed that the Affordable Care Act was more important than 
Republicans, t(170) = 5.817, p<0.0001. However, Democrats and Republicans did not 
statistically differ in their confidence of their assessment of their attitudes towards the Affordable 
Care Act, t(171) = 1.607, p = 0.11. Democrats and Republicans do statistically differ, though, on 
their confidence between the other two issues, Abortion and Environmental Protection. The 
means from the pre-test for each political issue are in table one. 
Perception of Candidates’ Attitudes  
Next, participants’ perceptions of each candidate’s attitudes were analyzed using the 
same procedure as done for participants’ own attitudes. An independent samples t-test revealed 
no significant differences between how participants perceived the Democratic candidate’s 
attitude on any of the three issues. On the confidence item, asking participants how confident 
they were in their assessment of their perception of each candidate’s attitude, participants did not 
statistically differ between groups (political parties). Similar trends are observed for participants’ 
assessment of both the Democratic candidates’ stance on Abortion and Environmental 
protection. These means are reported in Table two. 
Contrary to the data for the Democratic candidate, participants’ perceptions of the 
Republican candidate’s attitude towards the three political issues does differ between political 
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parties. Overall, Republican participants viewed the Republican candidate as more in favor of 
social policies than Democratic participants did. On Abortion, Republican participants (M = 
3.32) believed that the Republican candidate was more in favor of Abortion than Democrats (M 
= 2.50) did, t(169) = -2.569, p = 0.011. Additionally, Republican participants (M = 4.20) 
believed that the Republican candidate was more in favor of environmental protection than 
Democratic participants (M = 3.52), t(169) = -2.495, p = 0.014. There were no significant 
differences, however, on how participants perceived the Republican candidate’s attitude towards 
the Affordable Care Act, t(170) = -0.921, p = 0.359. Again, these means are reported in table 
two.  
Manipulation Checks  
Before performing analysis to test the main hypotheses, a manipulation check was used 
under the guise of a reading comprehension question. To assess the effectiveness of the choice 
manipulation, a 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between 
subjects’ ANOVA on the choice manipulation item found a main effect of choice, with 
participants in the high choice condition (M = 5.73) believing that the actor had more choice in 
giving the speech than participants in the low choice condition (M = 3.27), F(1, 167) = 60.916, p 
< 0.001, h2p = 0.267. The same ANOVA also indicated a marginal effect of political party, as 
Democrats (M = 4.34) rated the actor has having less choice than Republicans (M = 4.90), F(1, 
167) = 2.935, p = 0.089, h2p = 0.017.  
Infer an Underlying Attitude Consistent with the Behavior 
 To assess the first hypothesis that observers attribute the actor’s behavior to an 
underlying attitude consistent with the observed behavior, a 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA was used. As 
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political party affiliation was measured on both the pre-test and post-manipulation 
questionnaires, unless otherwise stated, all analyses reported use the political party indicated on 
the pre-test.1 Results indicate a significant main effect of choice such that those in the high 
choice condition (M = 3.49) believed that the actor was less in favor of the Affordable Care Act 
than those in the low choice condition (M = 4.72), F(1, 168) = 12.905, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.071. 
While Democrats (M = 3.99) were more likely to believe that the actor was against the 
Affordable Care Act than Republicans (M = 4.27) this difference was not statistically significant, 
F(1, 168) = 0.984, p = 0.323, h2p = 0.006. 
 To see if participants’ perceptions of the actor’s attitude changed from between the pre-
test and the post-manipulation questionnaire, a 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 
(Choice: High/Low) x 2 (Time: pre/post manipulation) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with time as a within-subject’s variable and political party and choice condition as 
between subject’s variables. Results indicate a main effect of time on perception of the actors’ 
attitude such that for all participants, the mean of their perception of the actor’s attitude after 
imagining him give the speech (M = 4.09) was significantly lower than their perception of the 
actor’s attitude on the pre-test (M = 5.96), F(1, 168) = 84.273, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.334 (see figure 
                                                
1 18 participants changed their party affiliation between the pre-test and the post-manipulation 
questionnaire. Of these, seven changed from Democrat to Republican and eleven changed from 
Republican to Democrat. It should be noted that the changes were not distributed evenly across 
choice conditions. Of the seven Democrats who changed affiliation, five were in the high choice 
condition. For Republicans, seven were in the low choice condition. 10 of the 18 participants had 
political orientation that was in the middle of the scale, as taken during session one. Since the 
participants measures of post-manipulation party affiliation were measured after participants 
imagined the actor give the speech it is difficult to know whether these participants did not 
adequately pay attention to the questions or if the change was a result of the manipulations. All 
18 participants passed the attention checks as previously described. All analyses were run again 
without these eighteen participants and the results were similar to those run with the entire 
sample, unless specifically stated otherwise. Thus, we decided to retain these 18 participants.  
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two). As with the above results, the repeated measures ANOVA indicates evidence of a 
statistically significant main effect of choice on perception of actor’s attitude, F(1, 168) = 7.861, 
p = 0.006, h2p = 0.045. Those in the high choice condition rated the actor’s attitude towards the 
Affordable Care Act on the pre-test (M = 5.96) as nearly identical to those in the low choice 
condition (M = 5.96) yet on the post-manipulation questionnaire the two conditions differed such 
that those in the high choice condition (M = 3.49) perceived the actor to be less in favor of the 
ACA than those in the low choice condition (M = 4.72). 
Perception of Consistency in Another Individual’s Attitude 
Recall of Another’s Attitude 
 Next, to test the second hypothesis that individuals would perceive their initial perception 
of the actor’s attitude as consistent with their current perception, a 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on participant’s 
recall of the actor’s attitude was conducted. Results indicate a statistically significant effect of 
choice, such that those in the high choice condition (M = 4.28) recalled the actor as being less in 
favor of the Affordable Care Act than those in the low choice condition (M = 5.42), F(1, 169) = 
14.494, p < 0.0001, h2p = 0.079. A similar ANOVA was conducted on participant’s recall of the 
actor’s prior attitude towards abortion, again revealing a main effect of choice, F(1, 169) = 
5.608, p = 0.019, h2p = 0.032. Those in the high choice condition (M = 4.61) recalled the actor as 
being less in favor of Abortion than those in the low choice condition (M = 5.42). Lastly, the 
same analysis was conducted on participants’ recall of the actor’s attitude on Environmental 
Protection, again revealing a main effect of choice. Participants in the high choice condition (M 
= 4.99) recalled the actor as being less in favor of protecting the environment than those in the 
low choice condition (M = 5.72), F(1, 169) = 5.296, p = 0.023.  
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Recall Error Score 
Additionally, an attitude recall error score was calculated for each participant by 
subtracting their initial assessment of the actor’s attitude from what they recalled the actor’s 
attitude to be, as done for participant’s own attitude change scores in Goethals and Reckman 
(1973) and Bem and McConnell (1970). In the scores reported below, a negative score indicates 
attitude change in the anti-Affordable Care Act direction, while a positive score indicates change 
in the pro-Affordable Care direction. A 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: 
High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on recall error score for the participant’s perception of 
the actor’s attitude on the Affordable Care Act found a main effect of choice, such that those in 
the high choice condition (M = -1.67) had a greater discrepancy between what they recalled the 
actor’s attitude to be and their actual inference of the attitude on the pre-test than those in the low 
choice condition (M = -0.54), F(1, 169) = 9.931, p = 0.002, h2p = 0.056.   
The same calculation was used to create a recall error score for participants’ recall of the 
actor’s attitude towards abortion and environmental protection. A 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on recall error for 
the participant’s perception of the actor’s attitude towards Abortion revealed no significant 
effects between conditions. However, the same between subjects’ ANOVA conducted on recall 
error for the participant’s perception of the actor’s attitude towards protecting the environment 
revealed a main effect of choice on recall error, F(1, 169) = 3.919, p = 0.049, h2p = 0.023. 
Participants in the high choice condition (M = -1.12) recalled the actor as being less in favor of 
protecting the environment than those in the high choice condition (M = -0.35). The means for 
recall of the actor’s attitude towards the three issues are reported in table four. For comparison 
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purposes, participant’s perceptions of the actor’s attitude on the pre-test have been placed in the 
same table (see table 4).  
Correlation Between Recall Inference and Post-Manipulation Inference of Actor’s Attitude 
To further understand the relationship between participants’ pre-test and post-
manipulation perceptions of the actor’s attitude and their recall of the attitude, correlations were 
run to test whether the post-manipulation perception of the actor’s attitude was better correlated 
with what participants’ recalled the actor’s attitude to be, compared to the correlation between 
the recall score and pre-manipulation perception of the actor’s attitude, as done in Goethals and 
Frost (1978). The correlation between the post-manipulation assessment of the actor’s attitude 
and recall score was r = 0.596, p < 0.0001, compared to the correlation between the participant’s 
pre-manipulation attitude and recall of the attitude, r = 0.083, p = 0.279. Since the results from 
the ANOVA indicated a main effect of choice on error recall, separate correlations were also 
conducted for both the high and low choice conditions. For the high choice condition, the 
correlation between the post-manipulation assessment of the actor’s attitude and recall score was 
r = 0.569, p < 0.0001, which contrasts the correlation between the pre-manipulation assessment 
of the actor’s attitude and error recall, r = -0.093, p = 0.384. For the low choice condition, the 
correlation between the post-manipulation assessment of the actor’s attitude and recall score was 
r = 0.548, p < 0.0001, while the correlation between the pre-manipulation assessment of the 
actor’s attitude and recall score was r = 0.324, p = 0.003. 
Subjective Measure of Actor’s Attitude Change 
The final question on the post-manipulation questionnaire asked participants to indicate 
the extent to which they believed that the actor had changed their attitude towards the Affordable 
Care Act. Recall that this measure was taken on a seven-point scale, with one (1) being no 
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change and seven (7) being completely changed (see Appendix E). A 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on subjective 
perception of the actor’s attitude change indicate main effects of both choice condition and of 
political party. Participants in the high choice condition (M = 3.51) were significantly more 
likely than participants in the low choice condition (M = 2.88) to believe that the actor had 
changed their attitude towards the ACA, F(1, 169) = 4.418, p = 0.037, h2p = 0.025. However, 
Democrats (M = 2.94) were less likely than Republicans (M = 3.72) to say that the actor had 
changed their attitude, F(1, 169) = 5.305, p = 0.022, h2p = 0.030. These means are reported 
below in table five. 
Observer’s Attitude Change 
 To test hypothesis three, that observers would change their own attitude in the direction 
of the actor’s behavior if the actor was an in-group member, an attitude change score was 
calculated for each participant by subtracting their pre-test attitude score from their post-
manipulation attitude score. As stated above, a negative score indicates change in attitude in the 
pro-Affordable Care Act direction, while a positive score indicates change in attitude in the anti-
Affordable Care Act direction. A 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: 
High/Low) between subject’s ANOVA was conducted on attitude change score, revealing a 
significant main effect of political party on attitude change. Overall, Democrats (M = -0.38) 
changed their attitude towards slightly against the Affordable Care Act (i.e. in the direction of 
the actor’s behavior), while Republicans became slightly more in favor of the Affordable Care 
Act (M = 0.13), F(1, 169) = 4.809, p = 0.03, h2p = 0.028. No significant effect of choice 
condition was found, as those in the high choice condition (M = -0.20) had nearly identical data 
to those in the low choice condition (M = -0.20), F(1, 169) = 0.003, p = 0.955, h2p = 0.000. 
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 Furthermore, regression analysis was conducted on attitude change scores, as done in 
Norton et al. (2003). Political party, choice condition, and party identification as reported on the 
pre-test were regressed as predictor variables on subject’s attitude change score. Results indicate 
that both political party and party identification are predictors of attitude change. Political party 
significantly predicts attitude change B = 0.527, t(167) = 2.289, p = 0.023, such that Republicans 
were more likely to change in favor of the Affordable Care Act, and the opposite effect for 
Democrats. Furthermore, party identification on the pre-test significantly predicts attitude 
change, B = -0.143, t(167) = -2.477, p = 0.014, such that those with increased party identification 
were more likely to change their attitude towards in opposition to the Affordable Care Act. Note 
that the same analysis was conducted again using post-manipulation party identification, political 
party, and choice condition as predictor variables on participants’ attitude change. These results 
indicate no significant effect of post-manipulation party, B = -0.052, t(168) = -0.788, p = 0.432 
but a significant effect of political party B = 0.515, t(168) = 2.222, p = 0.028.  
 Although differences exist in the predictive ability of party identification between pre-test 
and post manipulation measures, we should note that all results previously reported in Norton et 
al. (2003) (as well as other vicarious dissonance studies, see Monin et al., 2004) always used a 
measure of identification measured during the pre-test, before the manipulations. To better 
understand the effect of pre-test identification on attitude change, two separate analyses were 
conducted for both Democrats and Republicans, examining the effect of pre-test party 
identification on attitude change (see Norton et al., 2003). For Democrats, results indicate a 
marginally significant effect of pre-test party identification on attitude change, B = -0.125, p = 
0.064. For Republicans, results also indicate a marginally significant effect of pre-test party 
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identification on attitude change, B = -0.184, p = 0.105. Thus, in both parties, increased 
identification with the party predicts attitude change against the Affordable Care Act.  
Effect of the Importance of the Issue on Observer Attitude Change 
 As done with party identification, regression analysis was used to assess the effect of how 
important the Affordable Care Act was to participants on attitude change. The predictor variables 
were choice condition, political party, and importance of the Affordable Care Act on attitude 
change score. Results indicate no direct effect of political party or choice, but a direct effect of 
how important the Affordable Care Act was to each participant on attitude change, B =  
-0.318, t(168) = -4.408, p < 0.0001. Thus, the more important the Affordable Care Act was to 
participants, the more they changed their attitude in the direction of opposed to the Affordable 
Care Act.  
Perceived Consistency in Self for Those Having Changed Their Attitude 
 To test the fourth, and final, hypothesis that individuals who have changed their attitude 
will misperceive consistency in their attitudes if they have changed, an attitude recall error score 
was calculated for each participant in the same manner as done for perception of the actor’s 
attitude (recall score minus pre-test score). A 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 
(Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on participant error recall revealed no 
significant effects of political party or choice condition on participants’ attitude recall errors. 
However, given the low means reported by participants’ attitude change, regression analysis was 
conducted to see if participant attitude change predicts participant attitude recall errors. In other 
words, we were interested in whether those who did change their attitude (either for or against 
the Affordable Care Act) were likely to inaccurately recall their current attitude as consistent 
with their prior attitude. Thus, we conducted a simple linear regression of participant’s attitude 
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change score (post-manipulation attitude minus pre-manipulation attitude) on participant’s 
attitude recall error (recall score minus pre-manipulation attitude). Results indicated a significant 
effect of attitude change on recall error score, B = 0.529, t(169) = 10.636, p < 0.0001 (see figure 
three). Thus, participants who changed their attitude, either pro-Affordable Act or Anti-
Affordable Care Act, were more likely to perceive their prior attitude as consistent with their 
current attitude.  
Observer’s Perceived Similarity to the Actor 
 Measures of observers perceived similarity between themselves and the actor were taken 
on both the pre-test and during the post-manipulation questionnaires. A 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on pre-test 
perception of similarity to the Democratic candidate reveals, as expected, that Democrats (M = 
5.25) felt more similar to the actor (a Democrat) than Republicans (M = 3.60) did, F(1, 169) = 
43.140, p < 0.0001, h2p = 0.203. However, 2 (Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: 
High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on post-test perception of similarity to the actor found a 
significant main effect of choice and a marginally similar main effect of political party. 
Democrats (M = 4.20) perceived themselves as more significant to the actor than Republicans (M 
= 3.68) did, F(1, 169) = 3.219, p = 0.075, h2p = 0.019. Overall, though, participants in the high   
choice condition (M = 3.59) perceived themselves as less similar to the actor than those in the 
low choice condition (M = 4.49), F(1, 169) = 6.920, p = 0.009, h2p = 0.039.  
 Comparable measures were also taken for participant’s post-manipulation perception of 
both how identified the actor was and representative he was of the Democratic Party. A 2 
(Political Party: Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) between subjects’ ANOVA on 
both measures revealed no significant differences between political parties for either measure. 
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Both measures, however, indicated that those in the high choice condition believed the actor to 
be less identified and less representative of the Democratic party than those in the low choice 
condition. On the identification measure, those in the high choice condition (M = 5.23) believed 
the actor to be less identified than in the low choice condition (M = 5.73), F(1, 169) = 7.917, p = 
0.005, h2p = 0.045. Likewise, those in the high choice condition (M = 5.13) believed the actor to 
be less representative of the Democratic party than observers in the low choice condition (M = 
5.66), F(1, 169) = 6.754, p = 0.01, h2p = 0.038.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 Results provide support for each of the four predictions made in this study. Of note is 
evidence supporting the main, novel, hypothesis that observers will recall the actor’s prior 
attitude as being consistent with their perception of the actor’s current attitude. In this chapter, 
we will first review and interpret the results in terms of each hypothesis. Next, we will integrate 
findings from each hypothesis and discuss them more broadly in terms of attribution, social 
comparison, and cognitive dissonance theories. We will also consider alternative explanations, 
limitations, and directions for future research before concluding with the theoretical, 
methodological, and practical significance of the present study.  
 Recall that four predictions were made concerning how observers would react to 
witnessing an actor engage in counter-normative behavior. For the first hypothesis, we expected 
that observers would attribute the actor’s counter-normative behavior to an attitude that was 
consistent with that behavior. Despite no significant differences found between choice conditions 
or parties on the pre-test, observers in the high choice condition believed that the actor was less 
in favor of the Affordable Care Act than observers in the low choice condition after imagining 
the actor give the anti-Affordable Care Act speech. In addition to statistically significant 
differences between conditions (p < 0.001), an examination of the means of both conditions 
reveals meaningful significance as well (see table three). Recall that the post-manipulation 
assessment of the actor’s attitude was measured on a scale of one (strongly opposed) to seven 
(strongly in favor) scale, with four being the midpoint on the scale indicating an opinion from 
opposed to the Affordable Care Act (one to three) to in favor of the Affordable Care Act (five to 
seven). The mean of the low choice condition was 4.72 while the mean of the high choice 
condition was 3.49, indicating that observers in the high choice condition perceived the actor to 
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now be opposed to the Affordable Care Act, while observers in the low choice condition now 
perceive the actor to be somewhat ambivalent towards the Affordable Care Act.   
 Notably, these post-manipulation inferences of the actor’s attitude differ for all 
participants from their initial inference of the actor’s attitude (see figure two). The repeated 
measures ANOVA with time (pre-test questionnaire and post-manipulation attitude measure) as 
a within subjects’ variable revealed a significant difference (p < 0.0001) between the two attitude 
measures. It should be noted that the effect size between the two measures is quite large (h2p = 
0.334), indicating a meaningful shift for all participants in their perception of the actor’s attitude 
after giving the speech, relative to before he gave the speech. However, as stated above, 
observers in the high choice condition perceived the actor to be more against the Affordable Care 
Act than those in the low choice condition, which is reasonable given the success of the choice 
manipulation (p < 0.001, h2p = 0.267).  
 The second hypothesis, which built off the first hypothesis, was that observers would 
recall the actor’s original attitude as being consistent with their current attitude. Consistent with 
our findings from hypothesis one, participants in the high choice condition were more likely (p < 
0.0001) to recall the actor’s initial attitude as being less in favor of the Affordable Care Act than 
those in the low choice condition. The correlation (r = 0.596, p < 0.001) between the recall of the 
actor’s attitude and the post-manipulation perception of the actor’s attitude was significant 
relative to the correlation (r = 0.083, p = 0.279) between the recall of the actor’s attitude and the 
pre-test perception of the actor’s attitude. Furthermore, the recall error score (recall of actor’s 
attitude minus pre-test perception of actor’s attitude) indicated that both conditions recalled the 
actor as being more opposed to the Affordable Care Act relative to their prior inference. 
Observers in the high choice condition (M = -1.67) had a significantly greater discrepancy (p = 
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0.002) between their recall and pre-test perception of the actor’s attitude towards the Affordable 
Care Act, compared to the low choice condition (M = -0.54). Note that participants in both 
conditions had discrepancies between the recall and pre-test measure, although the discrepancy 
was higher in the high choice condition. 
 It is worth nothing that similar recall errors were found in observer’s perception of the 
actor’s attitude towards all three political issues. However, the effects were either not significant 
(Abortion) or barely significant (protecting the environment, p = 0.049), indicating that 
participants were more likely to inaccurately perceive consistency on the issue that had been 
manipulated (Affordable Care Act) relative to the other two issues. However, it should also be 
noted that for all three issues participants recalled the actor as being more opposed to the issue in 
the high choice than in the low choice condition. An examination of the mean differences 
between conditions (high and low choice) reveals a mean difference of -1.212 for the Affordable 
Care Act, -0.725 for abortion, and -0.65 for protecting the environment. These numbers indicate 
that observers in the high choice condition recalled the actor as being more opposed to the issue 
than those in the low choice condition. Therefore, while discrepancies occur between high and 
low choice conditions for all three issues, the discrepancy is greatest for the Affordable Care Act, 
which likely accounts for the statistically significant effect of choice condition on recall error for 
the Affordable Care Act but not for the other two issues. These findings lend support for the idea 
that recall errors were made because of the intended manipulations on the Affordable Care Act. 
It does appear, however, that some change did occur in how the observers perceived the actor’s 
attitude on the other issues (Abortion and Environmental Protection), though to a lesser extent 
than the Affordable Care Act. This, however, is not unexpected given that the three issues are all 
political and it is reasonable to assume that another’s attitudes on these three issues would be 
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correlated. An individual who advocates against the Affordable Care Act may no longer be 
perceived as being as in favor of Environmental Protection as they once were, given that both 
issues are typically held by progressive individuals. However, the effect would likely be lesser 
for Environmental Protection than the Affordable Care Act, a trend supported in the data.  
 Contrary to predications for the second hypothesis, no effect of political party was found 
on recall errors for any of the three political issues. For the Affordable Care Act, Democrats in 
the high choice condition (M = -1.68) were almost identical to Republicans in the high choice 
condition (M = -1.64) for their discrepancy between their recall and pre-test perception of the 
actor’s attitude. However, when participants were asked whether they believed the actor had 
changed, Democrats were less likely (p = 0.03) than Republicans to say that they believed that 
the actor had changed. Understandably, participants in the high choice condition were more 
likely (p = 0.037) to believe that the actor had changed than those in the low condition. Recall 
that this question was asked on a one (no change) to seven (completely changed) scale, and that 
all groups, with the exception of high choice Republicans were more likely to perceive the actor 
as not having changed than as changed (see table five). Although Democrats did not significantly 
differ from Republicans on their inference of the actor’s attitude or their recall of the actor’s 
prior attitude, they were still more likely to believe that the actor did not change than 
Republicans. This is likely indicative of a tendency to perceive consistency in in-group members, 
particularly in politics where there is a motivation to avoid being perceived as having changed 
one’s opinion. In other words, the motivation to perceive an in-group member as consistent 
appears to be a separate process from making a correspondent inference about the actor’s 
behavior as the parties do not significantly differ in their inference of the actor’s counter-
normative behavior.   
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 Somewhat surprisingly, while choice condition affected the attitude of the speaker, it did 
not affect the observer’s own attitude towards the Affordable Care Act, as might be expected in 
dissonance experiments. Recall that hypothesis three was that observers who viewed the actor as 
a valued in-group member would change their own attitude in the direction of the actor’s 
behavior. Again, results support this hypothesis as the attitude change score (post manipulation 
attitude minus pre-test attitude) was significantly (p = 0.03) different between Democrats (M =  
-0.38) and Republicans (M = 0.13). Recall that a negative score indicates change in the direction 
of the against Affordable Care Act, while a positive score indicates change of in favor of the 
Affordable Care Act. Thus, Democrats, on average, did change their own attitude slightly against 
the Affordable Care Act, while Republicans became slightly more in favor. Furthermore, the 
more important the issue was to the participants, the greater the attitude change towards 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act (B = -0.318, p < 0.0001). Lastly, the fourth hypothesis that 
participants who had changed their own attitude would perceive consistency in their attitudes 
was also supported by the data. Simple linear regression of attitude change score on participants’ 
error recall rate indicated a significant relationship between the two variables (B = 0.529, p < 
0.0001). Thus, participants who changed their attitudes in the direction of less support for the 
Affordable Care Act were more likely to recall themselves as being opposed to the Affordable 
Care Act, and vice versa (see table two).  
 Lastly, it should be noted that despite the inference that the actor was against the 
Affordable Care Act, such a change did not have drastic effects on whether observers believed 
the actor was representative of the Democratic party or identified with the Democratic party. 
Observers in the high choice condition believed the actor was less identified (p = 0.005) and less 
representative (p = 0.01) of the Democratic party than those in the low choice condition. While 
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the results significantly differ between condition, the difference is relatively small. On both 
scales, a one (1) indicates not very identified/representative, while a seven (7) indicates very 
identified/representative. On identification, the means between high choice condition (M = 5.23) 
and low choice condition (M = 5.73) are relatively similar. Likewise, on representativeness, the 
means between high choice (M = 5.13) and low choice (M = 5.66) indicate that although a 
statistically significant difference was found, both parties were still more likely to perceive the 
actor as being a member of the Democratic party than not. A similar pattern emerges on the post-
manipulation similarity measure shows that Democrats were slightly more similar (p = 0.075) to 
the actor than Republicans did, while those in the high choice condition perceived themselves to 
be less similar (p = 0.009) to the actor than those in the low choice condition.  
Integration of Results and Theory: Perception of the Actor’s Attitude  
 Results indicate support, or partial support, for all four hypotheses in the study. Thus, the 
first goal of the study was achieved in examining the impact of misperceiving consistency of an 
actor’s attitude between two dissonant inferences. However, an analysis of the second aim of this 
study, to examine the role of the actor’s attitude in a vicarious dissonance paradigm is warranted. 
Thus, a relevant question is whether our results can be interpreted in accordance with the 
vicarious dissonance framework (Norton et al., 2003; Cooper & Hogg, 2007). While participants 
who imagined an in-group member engage in counter-normative behavior did move slightly 
against the Affordable Care Act, the mean attitude change (M = -0.38) is not enough to represent 
a meaningful change in attitude. Thus, unlike participants’ inference of the actor’s attitude, 
which does indicate meaningful change from pro-Affordable Care Act to anti-Affordable Care 
Act, participants own attitudes do not have appeared to change in the same meaningful manner, 
despite the statistical significance between the means of the two parties.  
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Furthermore, no effect of choice was found on participant’s attitude (a typical finding in 
dissonance research, Cooper & Fazio, 1984) despite the success of the choice manipulation. 
These results point to a similar pattern that has emerged in vicarious dissonance research. The 
original study on vicarious dissonance (Norton et al., 2003, study 1) employed a 2 (choice: 
high/low) x 2 (group: in-group/out-group) factorial design and only found a significant effect of 
group (in-group or out-group) and identification when regressed on attitude change score 
(calculated the same way as in the present study). As in the present study, the choice 
manipulation in Norton et al. (2003) study 1 was successful, but did not appear to affect 
participants’ attitude change. Norton et al. (2003) study 3 again manipulated choice using a 
stronger manipulation that increased the effect size of the manipulation. The conclusion that was 
drawn from these results was that, as in cognitive dissonance studies, choice is a necessary 
precursor for attitude change resulting from dissonance, whether personal or experienced 
vicariously (Norton et al., 2003).  
Another explanation does exist, however, that explains why the choice manipulation 
would be successful, yet not affect observer attitude change in both the present study and Norton 
et al. (2003) study one. This explanation involves a consideration of findings from attribution 
theory, particularly the correspondence bias. As discussed previously in chapter one, individuals 
are biased to infer a correspondence between behavior and underlying attitudes, regardless of the 
situational constraints placed on the actor (Jones & Gilbert, 1986; Gilbert, & Malone, 1995). 
Recall that early studies of this phenomenon found that regardless of the degree of choice 
afforded the actor, individuals inferred correspondence between an actor’s attitude and behavior, 
particularly when the behavior was unexpected (low prior probability of occurring). While the 
correspondent inference was stronger in the high choice condition, such inference was still made 
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in the low choice condition, albeit to a lesser degree. As in the present study, these results 
occurred even with the success of a choice manipulation (Jones & Harris, 1967).  
As described above, the results from the present study reveal a similar trend. Although 
participants in the high choice condition inferred the actor to be more anti-Affordable Care Act 
than those in the low choice condition, both conditions inferred the actor to be more against the 
Affordable Care Act than their initial perception of the actor’s attitude, as measured during the 
pre-test (see figure two). Thus, while the magnitude of the correspondent inference varied in 
conjunction with the perception of choice, an inference was still made in both conditions of 
either anti-ACA (high choice, M = 3.49) or ambivalent towards the ACA (low choice, M = 4.72), 
compared to the original pro-ACA inference (both conditions, M = 5.96). Although the choice 
manipulation was successful in both the present study and Jones and Harris (1967), it does not 
appear that such knowledge was taken into consideration as strongly as one might expect. Given 
that other attribution theories have argued that individuals tend to have greater insight into the 
situational constraints that affect their own behavior relative to the behavior of others (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1972), it is not surprising that observers did not take choice into account as would be 
expected. Rationally, observers who indicated that the actor had low choice in giving the speech 
would attribute the behavior to the situation, and not the actor’s underlying attitude. It is 
reasonable to expect, then, that observers might recognize the constraint but do not take it into 
consideration in their analysis of this behavior. This suggestion that “behavior engulfs the field” 
appears to be supported by the data, as initially suggested by Jones and Harris (1967).  
Integration of Results and Theory: Observer’s Attitude Change 
A likely scenario that could explain the results of the study is that observers infer that the 
actor’s attitude is consistent with the behavior (anti-Affordable Care Act) and change their own 
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attitude in the direction of the actor’s behavior if they perceive the actor to be a similar other. 
Recall that a main principle of social comparison theory is that individuals prefer to compare 
themselves to similar others to evaluate their own opinions and attitudes (Festinger, 1954). 
Goethals and Darley (1977) believe that such a comparison creates a situation in which “it will 
be difficult to account for the belief difference in terms of an internal characteristic that the 
consensus has but that he does not have”, thus indicating that a discrepancy in attitude between 
an observer and similar other (actor) would lead the observer to conclude that their attitude is 
incorrect (p. 270). The moderate correlation (r = -0.248, p = 0.001) in the data between similarity 
to the actor and participant attitude change on the Affordable Care indicates that observers who 
viewed the actor as a similar other changed their attitude to be consistent with the actor. 
Festinger (1957) argues that “the existence of disagreement among members of a group on some 
issue or some opinion, if perceived by the members, certainly produces cognitive dissonance” (p. 
178). In this situation, observers can change their own attitude, attempt to change the other 
person’s attitude, or cease comparison to the actor through derogation (Festinger, 1957). As 
evidenced by the correlation between similarity and attitude change, observers opted to change 
their own attitude as, given the experimental design, were unable to change the actor’s attitude.  
However, whether observers derogated the actor is worthy of consideration. On the post-
manipulation questionnaire, participants were asked to identify the actor’s party. Note that they 
had been informed of the actor being a Democrat at the start of the session roughly five to seven 
minutes earlier, 47 participants identified the actor as a Republican, while the remainder 
identified him as a Democrat. An analysis of variance on participant attitude change score (see 
above) was conducted separately for participants who identified the actor as a Democrat and 
those who identified him as a Republican. For those who identified the actor as a Democrat, the 
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results showed the same trend as reported earlier, that in-group members (M = -0.37), changed 
their attitude in the direction of the actor’s behavior, while out-group members changed in the 
opposite direction (M = 0.26), p = 0.024. However, for those who identified the actor as 
Republican the effect on attitude change is no longer statistically significant between political 
parties (p = 0.574).  
To better understand this change, we then conducted a 2 (Political Party: 
Democrat/Republican) x 2 (Choice: High/Low) x 2 (Similarity to actor: pre/post manipulation) 
repeated measures ANOVA. Again, this was conducted separately for those who identified the 
actor as a Democrat and those who identified him as a Republican. Results, indicate that 
Democrats who still identified the actor as a Democrat did believe they were slightly less similar 
after imagining the actor give the speech (M = 4.69) than before he had given the speech (M = 
5.26), p = 0.002, h2p = 0.078. However, Democrats who identified the actor as Republican 
drastically changed how similar they perceived themselves to be to the actor before imagining 
him give the speech (M = 5.21) than on the post-manipulation questionnaire (M = 2.42), p = 
0.001,  h2p = 0.231. Based on these data, in-group members either changed their attitude in the 
direction of the actor’s behavior or ceased comparison, consistent with Festinger’s (1957) 
predictions.  
The data presented here, then, can be best understood in terms of an integration between 
social comparison and cognitive dissonance theories. Festinger argues that “another way of 
reducing dissonance between one’s own opinion and the knowledge that someone holds a 
different opinion is to make the other person, in some manner, not comparable to oneself”, which 
can be achieved if the observers “reject him or derogate him” (Festinger, 1957, p. 182). 
Important here is the “knowledge”, or awareness, of the observer realizing that the observer no 
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longer holds an attitude that is consistent with the actor, which produces either attitude change or 
derogation. Therefore, individuals, having attributed the actor’s behavior to an attitude consistent 
with that behavior, either changed their own attitude as well or derogated the individual.   
Note that this explanation differs from vicarious dissonance theory, which states that that 
observers change their attitude even though the actor has not changed his own attitude, and thus 
do not conform (Monin et al., 2004; Cooper & Hogg, 2007). However, for the present study, the 
correlation between attitude change score for participants and perception of change in the actor 
(post-manipulation inference minus pre-test inference) is 0.278 (p < 0.001). Thus, the more 
participants infer the actor changing in favor (or against) the ACA the more they change in favor 
(or against) themselves., thus supporting the conformity interpretation, which contradictor to 
vicarious dissonance theory. As for the choice manipulation, Norton et al. (2003) acknowledge 
that the lack of effect of choice on the earlier studies could be a result of a dispositional inference 
and in later studies when the actor in the low choice condition is perceived as being coerced into 
giving a counter-attitudinal speech, then choice is found to produce attitude change. Based on 
their analysis and attribution theory it is plausible that if the study design could override the 
observer’s natural tendency to make attributions based on internal, and not external, 
explanations, then choice may have a significant effect on attitude change. This proposition, 
however, is unable to be tested with the current data and is worthy of further research.   
 This is not to imply, however, that participants are not experiencing dissonance in the 
present study. Several data that align with Festigner’s (1957) propositions supports dissonance 
occurring. First, although choice condition did not impact attitude change, participant’s attitude 
change varied as a function of how important they believed the Affordable Care Act to be. Thus, 
the more important participants believed the Affordable Care Act was, the more they changed 
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their attitude against the Affordable Care Act (B = -0.318, p < 0.0001). This is consistent with 
one of Festinger’s (1957) predictions that the more important the issue is to the individual the 
greater the magnitude of dissonance and greater motivation to reduce the dissonance by changing 
one of the inconsistent cognitions. Second, and in relation to Festinger’s (1957) integration of 
social comparison theory and cognitive dissonance theory, discrepancy in attitudes between an 
in-group actor and observer will prompt the observer to either change their opinion in the 
direction of the actor’s behavior or cease comparison. As mentioned above, the data supports this 
proposition.  
 Here, we propose that the correspondent inference made by observers after witnessing the 
actor give a speech against the Affordable Care Act is now in violation with their previous 
perception of the actor’s attitude towards the Affordable Care Act. Again, although observers in 
the high choice condition believed the actor to be more anti-Affordable Care Act than the low 
choice condition, all participants differed significantly differed between their two inferences. 
Thus, when the observers were asked to try to recall the actor’s attitude for purposes of accuracy 
(the demand characteristic), implicit in this directive is the notion that there is one “true” attitude. 
Given that the participants had already publically committed to their post-manipulation 
correspondent inference, the prior inference is now dissonant to what they have just publically 
endorsed. According to cognitive dissonance theory, the cognition that is least resistant to change 
will change to restore consonance (Festinger, 1957). Presumably, this cognition would be the 
prior attitude attribution as this is the one that observers have not just committed to. Thus, 
observers restore consonance in their perception of the actor by forgetting their past inference 
and believing that the current inference is the “correct” one.  
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Implicit in this analysis is the notion that two inconsistent perceptions of another’s 
attitudes can be a source of dissonance for the observer, which can cause either attitude change 
or derogation for in-group members.  This appears to occur outside of an in-group relationship 
with the actor as no significant difference between inferences of the actor’s behavior and on the 
pre-test or post-manipulation questionnaires were found between groups (political parties). Thus, 
one possible way of reducing the dissonance aroused from two inconsistent inferences would be 
to alter one’s recollection of the prior inference to make it consistent with the “new” or current 
inference. However, this would likely only occur if both inferences of the actor’s attitude are 
attributed to an underlying attitude consistent with the behavior. If one of the inferences is 
attributed to external causes (i.e. coercion) then this would likely not arouse dissonance in the 
observer since these two cognitions would no longer be inconsistent. For example, if a 
politician’s speech could be attributed to a need to win votes and not representative of his 
underlying attitude, then comparing two inferences of the actor’s behavior would not be 
dissonant, since one would could be attributed to external (situational) influences. There may be 
instances where it may even be more beneficial for an observer to attribute an actor’s behavior to 
the situation, particularly if doing so would serve the observer’s interests, such as derogating the 
individual. Again, this is worthy of further exploration and beyond the data analyzed in this 
study. 
Alternative Explanations 
 A discussion of other possible explanations of the results presented in this study is 
warranted. Perhaps most important is whether observers truly forgot their initial inference of the 
actor’s attitude. One potential challenge to this is the notion that participants could remember 
their prior inference and were attempting to appear consistent. Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 
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(1971) argue that cognitive dissonance can be understood as impression management, in that 
individuals do not necessarily change their attitude after engaging in counter-attitudinal behavior, 
but merely to appear consistent and credible to the experimenters. While it is possible that 
participants did not want to appear inconsistent, recall that the demand characteristics of the 
study were placed on accuracy of recall, not on consistency of recall. Furthermore, the final 
question of the post-manipulation questionnaire asked participants what they believed was the 
purpose of the study, which was originally used as an attention check. A fair number of the 
responses indicate that participants were aware the purpose of the study was to test their recall of 
the actor’s attitude. For example, participants report believing that the purpose of the study was 
to test “our memory if we remember what the campaign was before and how our opinions can 
change”. Several other participants mention believing the study was a memory test, indicating 
that they believed they were being assessed on accuracy of memory. Note that a similar 
interpretation of the data in relation to Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1971) was also made 
in Goethals and Reckman (1973) and appears to apply to the present study as well. 
 Another potential explanation arises on the question of whether individuals can truly 
forget a prior attitude or inference of another’s behavior. Recent research examining the 
difference between explicit and implicit attitude change has revealed differences in the extent of 
information required to change one’s attitude. Explicit attitudes are believed to be easier to 
change, relative to implicit attitudes, which are harder to change (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & 
Jarvis, 2006; Ferguson, Mann, Cone, & Shen, 2019). Such work has been applied to cognitive 
dissonance research, finding that while engaging in a forced-compliance task did change 
participant’s explicit attitudes, result from an implicit association test (IAT) revealed no attitude 
change. Researchers concluded that, contrary to Bem and McConnell’s (1970) findings, 
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individuals could still remember their pre-test attitudes on an implicit level (Gawronski & Strack, 
2004). While it is possible that participants in the present study would show similar results, the 
level of interest in the present study is on explicit, and not implicit, attitudes. Still, the potential 
change in implicit attitudes is a question worthy of further research that is beyond the scope of 
the present study. 
Limitations 
 In discussing the generalizability of the present study, it is important to acknowledge 
several limitations. Notably, the online nature of the experiment is one limitation of the current 
study. While research on the use of online surveys tends to indicate reliable data (see 
Buhrmester, Talifar, & Gosling, 2018 for a recent review), some researchers still question its use. 
For instance, recent criticisms by prominent dissonance theorists have questioned whether online 
surveys can create a situation involving enough to engage participants to change their attitudes 
(see Aronson, 2019). In addressing this limitation several precautions were taken, as noted in the 
methods section, that are consistent with recommendations. For example, attention checks were 
used and only online workers with above a 95% HIT completion rate were recruited to 
participate in the study (Buhrmester, Talifar, & Gosling, 2018). Online surveys have benefits, 
including larger sample sizes, that aid in achieving the necessary statistical power for the 
analysis. For the specific purposes of the present study, recent studies on vicarious dissonance 
have been successfully conducted through mTurk using similar designs as the present study 
(Blackman, Keller, & Cooper, 2016; Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman, 2019). It is possible, 
though, that the effects would have stronger had the study been conducted in a laboratory setting, 
and is worthy of future investigation.  
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 The second limitation pertains to the use of political parties as the group manipulation. 
Although doing so provided convenient, natural groups, one could argue that political parties are 
better defined as ideologies than groups. A wide range of research has shown that differences 
exist between political parties, especially in conservatives’ willingness to rationalize perceived 
changes, particularly in political settings (see Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002). In much of the 
vicarious dissonance research, experimenters used naturally occurring groups (e.g. residential 
colleges) and the counter-attitudinal issue was not one that was attached to typical stance of a 
group. Since being in favor of or opposed to the Affordable Care Act is closely related to a 
specific political party, the actor espousing an anti-Affordable Care Act position (i.e. a 
Republican associated position) it may have had an unintentional impact on participant’s attitude 
change. This might explain why for both political parties, identification predicts attitude change 
in anti-Affordable Care Act direction, which differs from results reported in Norton et al. (2003), 
where identification predicts in-group attitude change in the direction of the actor’s behavior, and 
vice-versa for the out-group. Still, the design of the present study is consistent with recent 
research (Cooper, Feldman, & Blackman, 2019), but assessing the reliability of results in this 
study to another domain beyond politics is worthy of future research.  
Significance and Implications  
 The present study provides support for the novel finding of observers misperceiving 
consistency in an actor who has changed their attitude. As two inconsistent inferences of the 
actor’s attitude would be dissonant, one route of dissonance reduction appears to be altering the 
prior inference of the actor’s behavior to be consistent with the current inference. Thus, the data 
presented in this study provide the opportunity for further research and refinement of this finding 
to test both the robustness and caveats of misperceiving an actor’s inconsistent attitudes and 
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behavior. Although recent research has focused on how individuals who behave counter-
attitudinally are perceived (e.g. Brannon, Sacchi, & Gawronski, 2017; Herak, Martinie, & 
Kamiejski, 2018), this is the first study to examine what individuals perceive to be the actor’s 
“true” attitude when inconsistencies in attributions emerge. As previously noted, the results 
indicate that observers perceive the “true” attitude to be the actor’s most current attitude and 
misperceive consistency between the actor’s current and initial attitude. Furthermore, these 
effects impact not only the counter-attitudinal behavior that the participants imagined, but other 
correlated issues as well. All of this occurred without excessive derogation of the actor, as the 
majority of in-group members still believed the actor to be a member of the in-group and 
perceived only slight decreases in similarity. Thus, while the actor was believed to be slightly 
less representative and identified with the in-group, the differences were not drastic and the actor 
was still perceived to be more identified with the group than less identified.  
From a methodological standpoint, the present study presents a new paradigm to study 
attributions of attitudes by separating the initial inference and the subsequent attribution over the 
course of a week, thus assessing the effect of memory and recall when an actor has behaved 
differently between the two sessions. From a practical perspective, this study suggests that 
situations may arise when an observer is unable to accurately remember the past attitude of 
another individual. Given the current political environment in which politicians and leaders 
appear to change their attitudes frequently, understanding why observers arrive at different 
conclusions about the same individual’s attitudes could prove useful in further understanding 
political divides that occur. One explanation, then, for why people continue to follow leaders 
who behave counter-normatively may be that they inaccurately recall their prior attribution of the 
individual’s attitude, not recognizing that attitude change has occurred.  
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Tables 
Issue Item Democrats  
(n = 113) 
Republicans 
(n = 60) 
Mean 
Difference 
Affordable 
Care Act 
Attitude 5.72 3.47 2.250* 
Importance 5.82 4.46 1.365* 
Confidence 5.88 5.52 0.359 
Abortion Attitude 6.06 4.10 1.962* 
Importance 5.67 4.28 1.386* 
Confidence 6.19 5.58 0.618 
Environmental 
Protection 
Attitude 6.23 4.73 1.499* 
Importance 6.03 4.45 1.577* 
Confidence 6.19 5.55 0.645*** 
Table 1. Pre-test means of participant’s attitudes on political issues by party. 
*p < 0.0001 
**p < 0.007 
***p < 0.003 
 
Issue Candidate Item Democrats  
(n = 113) 
Republicans 
(n = 60) 
Mean 
Difference 
Affordable 
Care Act 
Democratic 
Candidate 
Attitude 6.00 5.87 0.13 
Confidence 5.93 5.75 0.18 
Republican 
Candidate 
Attitude 3.09 3.35 0.261 
Confidence 5.44 4.97 0.475* 
Abortion Democratic 
Candidate 
Attitude 5.96 5.70 0.26 
Confidence 5.81 5.70 0.11 
Republican 
Candidate 
Attitude 2.50 3.32 0.821** 
Confidence 5.66 5.37 0.29 
Environmental 
Protection 
Democratic 
Candidate 
Attitude 6.19 6.02 0.17 
Confidence 6.15 5.78 0.37 
Republican 
Candidate 
Attitude 3.52 4.20 0.68** 
Confidence 5.41 5.07 0.34 
Table 2. Pre-test means of participant’s perception of both candidate’s attitude towards each 
political issue and their confidence in their assessment of the candidate’s attitude. 
*p < 0.05 
**p<0.01 
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 Pre-Test 
Questionnaire 
Post-Manipulation 
Questionnaire 
Mean Difference 
High Choice 
Condition 
5.96 3.49 2.47* 
Low Choice 
Condition 
5.96 4.72 1.24* 
Total 5.96 4.09 1.793** 
Table 3. Participant’s perception of the actor’s attitude towards the Affordable Care Act on both 
the pre-test and post-manipulation questionnaires, broken down by choice condition. 
*p < 0.006 
**p < 0.0001 
 
Item Condition Pre-Test Recall of 
Attitude 
Recall Error 
Score 
Affordable Care 
Act 
High Choice 
Condition  
(n = 90) 
5.94 4.28a -1.67 b 
Low Choice 
Condition  
(n = 83) 
5.96 5.42a -0.54 b 
Abortion High Choice 
Condition  
(n = 90) 
5.72 4.61c -1.11 
Low Choice 
Condition  
(n = 83) 
6.02 5.42c -0.60 
Environmental 
Protection 
High Choice 
Condition  
(n = 90) 
6.11 4.99d -1.12e 
Low Choice 
Condition  
(n = 83) 
6.15 5.72d -0.35e 
Table 4. Participant’s pre-test inference of the actor’s attitude, recall of the actor’s attitude, and 
error score (recall minus pre-test). Two values with the same letter in subscript indicate 
significant (p < 0.05) differences between means. 
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 High Choice 
Condition 
(n = 90) 
Low Choice 
Condition 
(n = 83) 
Total (by party) 
Democrats 
(n = 113) 
3.16 2.71 2.94b 
Republican 
(n = 60) 
4.12 3.22 3.72b 
Total (by condition) 3.51a 2.88a  
Table 5. Participant subjective perception of actor’s attitude change towards the Affordable Care 
Act. Subscript a signifies p = 0.37, subscript b signifies p = 0.022. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of vicarious self-perception. Screenshot taken from Goldstein and Cialdini 
(2007, p. 484), see references for complete citation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Participant’s perception of the actor’s attitude towards the ACA on the pre-test (initial), 
post-manipulation (final) and recall questionnaires, broken down by choice condition. Y-axis 
scale is one (1) strongly opposed to seven (7) strongly in favor. 
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Figure 3. Simple linear regression of participant’s attitude change score on participant’s attitude 
recall error score. Negative scores indicate anti-ACA and positive scores indicate pro-ACA. 
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Appendix A: Consent Forms 
 
Consent Form – Session 1 
You are being asked to take part in a research study of political campaigns. Details about this 
study are discussed below. It is important that you understand this information so that you can 
make an informed choice about being in this research study. If you have questions, please feel 
free to contact the researchers (listed below) for more information.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about how people believe political campaigns evolve 
over time. The study will be in two parts. Part one will be today and part two will be conducted 
next week. You are free to opt out of the study at any time. Participation in today’s portion of 
the study does not bind you to participate in next week’s study. If you chose to participate, you 
will receive compensation for both today’s study and next week’s study. 
The study should take approximately ten minutes to complete. If you agree to participate, the 
answers you provide will be used to influence future political elections and you will be asked to 
think about and give your opinion on certain sensitive political issues, such as abortion, 
healthcare, and immigration.  
 Contact Information 
This research is being conducted by Kevin Kennedy and Dr. George Goethals of the University 
of Richmond. If you have any questions about the project, please contact Kevin Kennedy at 
kevin.kennedy@richmond.edu.  
Possible Risks  
The risks associated with this study are minimal. That is, the risks for completing this study are 
no more than the risks experienced in daily life. If you do experience any discomfort during the 
study, remember you can stop at any time without any penalty. You may also choose not to 
answer particular questions that are asked in the study. 
Possible Benefits  
You will receive compensation for participating in this study. You may get some satisfaction 
from contributing to this investigation. 
Confidentiality of Records 
Reasonable steps will be taken to ensure that your individual results will remain confidential.  
However, as with any research process, the risk of a breach of confidentiality is always possible. 
Nevertheless, to the best of the investigators’ abilities, your answers in this study will remain 
anonymous and confidential.  Once the study is completed, we will completely “deidentify” our 
data. All identifiers will be removed from the identifiable private information and only then will 
the information be used for future research studies.  
Use of Information and Data Collected 
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us. Your responses will not be associated with you 
by name and the data you provide will be kept secure. What we find from this study may be 
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presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these 
presentations or papers. 
Protections and Rights  
If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Chair of the University of Richmond’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research at (804) 484-1565 or irb@richmond.edu for information or 
assistance. 
Statement of Consent 
The study has been described to me and I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
I may discontinue my participation at any time without penalty. I understand that my responses 
will be treated confidentially and used only as described in this consent form. I understand that 
if I have any questions, I can pose them to the researcher. I have read and understand the above 
information and I consent to participate in this study by clicking “Continue.”  Additionally, I 
certify that I am 18 years of age or older.  
 
Participants will click: 
 
 “Yes, I agree; I wish to begin the study” (Continue) to start the study.  
 
Or  
 
“No, I do not agree; I do not wish to participate” to not participate. 
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Consent Form – Session 2 
You are being asked to take part in a research study of political campaigns. Details about this 
study are discussed below. It is important that you understand this information so that you can 
make an informed choice about being in this research study. If you have questions, please feel 
free to contact the researchers (listed below) for more information.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about how people believe political campaigns evolve 
over time. The study will be in two parts. Part one was completed last week and part two will be 
completed today. You are free to opt out of the study at any time. Participation in last week’s 
study does not bind you to participation in today’s study. If you chose to participate, you will 
receive compensation for today’s study as you did for last week’s study. 
The study should take approximately fifteen minutes to complete. If you agree to participate, the 
answers you provide will be used to influence future political elections and you will be asked to 
think about and give your opinion on certain sensitive political issues, such as abortion, 
healthcare, and immigration.  
 Contact Information 
This research is being conducted by Kevin Kennedy and Dr. George Goethals of the University 
of Richmond. If you have any questions about the project, please contact Kevin Kennedy at 
kevin.kennedy@richmond.edu.  
Possible Risks  
The risks associated with this study are minimal. That is, the risks for completing this study are 
no more than the risks experienced in daily life. If you do experience any discomfort during the 
study, remember you can stop at any time without any penalty. You may also choose not to 
answer particular questions that are asked in the study. 
Possible Benefits  
You will receive compensation for participating in this study. You may get some satisfaction 
from contributing to this investigation. 
Confidentiality of Records 
Reasonable steps will be taken to ensure that your individual results will remain confidential.  
However, as with any research process, the risk of a breach of confidentiality is always possible. 
Nevertheless, to the best of the investigators’ abilities, your answers in this study will remain 
anonymous and confidential.  Once the study is completed, we will completely “deidentify” our 
data. All identifiers will be removed from the identifiable private information and only then will 
the information be used for future research studies.  
Use of Information and Data Collected 
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us. Your responses will not be associated with you 
by name and the data you provide will be kept secure. What we find from this study may be 
presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these 
presentations or papers. 
Protections and Rights  
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If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Chair of the University of Richmond’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research at (804) 484-1565 or irb@richmond.edu for information or 
assistance. 
Statement of Consent 
The study has been described to me and I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
I may discontinue my participation at any time without penalty. I understand that my responses 
will be treated confidentially and used only as described in this consent form. I understand that 
if I have any questions, I can pose them to the researcher. I have read and understand the above 
information and I consent to participate in this study by clicking “Continue.”  Additionally, I 
certify that I am 18 years of age or older.  
 
Participants will click: 
 
 “Yes, I agree; I wish to begin the study” (Continue) to start the study.  
 
Or  
 
“No, I do not agree; I do not wish 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
Appendix B: Session One Materials 
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Appendix C: Session Two High Choice Condition 
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Appendix D: Session 2 Low Choice Condition 
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Appendix E: Session 2 Post-Manipulation Questionnaires 
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